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LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY: TWO FACETS OF
THE INCULCATION OF VIRTUE
STANLEY INGBER'
I. INTRODUCTION: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES
A. Tinker in Context
Adolescence is a time of rebellion, growth, change, and the beginning
of meaningful self-awareness. It is not suprising, therefore, that the 1960s,
which constituted the adolescent period of the baby-boomer generation, was
noted for its lack of commitment to discipline, obedience and deference to
authority.' It was a time remembered more for political and cultural
conflict, urban chaos, civil rights battles, free speech movements on
university campuses, and, perhaps most of all, the national divide over the
Vietnam War. The 1960s was an era during which the value of order-of
deference to authority-was challenged profoundly, to the great chagrin of
those who view order as an imperative in a civilized society.
This era of turmoil is the context in which one must understand the
Supreme Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,2 the twenty-fifth anniversary of which decision this
Symposium commemorates. In Tinker, the Supreme Court struck down a
school regulation prohibiting the wearing of black armbands to protest the
Vietnam War. In sweeping language, the Justices declared their rejection
of the proposition that students "shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."3
In an age when claims of liberty were embraced increasingly while
those heralding authority were deemed suspect, one would have been most
* © 1994 by Stanley Ingber. James Madison Endowed Chair in Constitutional Law, Drake
University. B.A. 1969, Brooklyn College; J.D. 1972, Yale Law School.
I The 1960s created a "new mood," displacing "social complacency" with a "clamor for bold
leadership in all areas of American life." ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF
AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 18 (1990). This "new mood" was based in part on the
"restless idealism of the postwar baby-boom generation that was just coming of age." Id.
2 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3 Id. at 506.
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surprised had the Court ruled that students were totally devoid of First
Amendment protections. Indeed, as Professor Bruce Hafen, my colleague
in this symposium, has noted, the facts of Tinker provided an ideal setting
for the affirmation of students' free speech interests.5 The students wore
black armbands peacefully and with their parents' consent, their symbolic
expression addressed what likely was the most important political issue of
the day, and their statement did not contest educational policy; it was more
akin to a personal conversation among students concerning public issues,
a conversation that neither intruded upon the work of the schools, nor
implied any official endorsement.6
The language of the Court's opinion, however, initially appeared to
be significantly more far-reaching than the aforementioned facts warranted.
Committed to the position that state-operated schools were forbidden from
serving as little "enclaves of totalitarianism" in which school officials
possessed "absolute authority over their students,",7 the Court held that the
state could not confine students to the expression of only officially
approved sentiments.8  Noting the need to foster intellectual traits
consistent with those required of a democratic polity, the majority
emphasized the role of education in providing a participatory forum for the
exchange of ideas, a forum crucial in the training of future leaders.9
Essentially, the classroom was to serve as a "marketplace of ideas.""
Thus, school officials could not prohibit expression on the basis of an
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance,"" but could do so
only on the basis of "facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
I Indeed, earlier cases had already demonstrated that free speech claims were potentially valid
in public school environs. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (prohibiting schools from compelling students to salute American flag).
5 Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions,
1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 688 [hereinafter Hafen, Hazelwood].
6 Id.
" Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
8 Id.
9 Id., at 512. The Court emphasized that such training required "wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues. [rather] than any kind of
authoritative selection.'" Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589. 603 (1967)). The Court appeared to be merging free speech arguments
grounded in the community's interest in character building with those based on an uninhibited
"search for truth." For a discussion of the multi-faceted functions of rights claims generally and
free speech claims specifically, see infra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.




school activities . . 2
Such language understandably was disconcerting to those who believed
that order and obedience to authority are necessary prerequisites for
effective learning. 3 Tinker engendered fear of anarchy, of schools in
utter disarray as students questioned the decisions and disobeyed the
directives of educational officials and professionals. Envisioning education-
al institutions increasingly beleaguered by students "running loose,
conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins and smash-ins,"' 4 Justice Black cried
out in dissent, "I ... disclaim ... that the Federal Constitution compels
the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the
American public school system to public school students."' 5
Tinker may not have caused the cataclysmic results feared by Justice
Black, but the decision did portend difficulty for many school officials. If
their authority were constrained by student free speech rights, what limit
could be placed upon students' disregard of efforts to establish a given
level of order and decorum in the schools? If free speech rights meant that
students could choose their own beliefs, at what juncture would schools be
prohibited from requiring the acceptance of certain information or from
inculcating certain values? Would every effort to impose authority be open
to defiance, leading to litigation if disciplinary action were taken? Under
such a regime, how could schools educate? Were there no longer any
givens or truths? As one scholar lamented during this period of institution-
al uncertainty, school personnel "are no longer sure that they know what
is right, or if they do, that they have any right to impose it."' 6
Most assuredly, much obedience and deference to authority is
necessary for schools to function effectively. 7  In fact, Bruce Hafen has
1, Id. at 514.
'1 See, e.g., id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that purpose of public schools is to
teach children through use of order and discipline).
'1 Id. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting).
-Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting).
6 Gerald Grant, The Character of Education and the Education of Character, AM. EDUC.,
Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 37, 42. Bruce Hafen attributes this self-doubt in educational professionals to
the development of a pluralistic society:
If American society's pluralism makes it inappropriate for a school to teach particular
religious and moral values, we can easily begin to believe that same pluralism also
makes it inappropriate to teach general moral values-especially in a day when we
increasingly, and'unwisely, associate all moral codes and assumptions with particular
ethnic and class-oriented backgrounds.
Bruce C. Hafen, Schools as Intellectual and MoralAssociations, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 617
[hereinafter Hafen, Schools].
11 In fact, some published studies suggest that academic achievement improves when schools
maintain strong disciplinary policies, homework expectations, and attendance requirements. See,
19951
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gone so far as to insist that "only by submitting to the authoritative
direction of teachers [can] young people learn the skills, attitudes, and
understandings without which they cannot successfully sustain the operation
of a democratic society.""8  The importance of education in inculcating
values and, thereby, integrating children into their normative community
was recognized by the Court in the landmark civil rights decision Brown
v. Board of Education.9 Brown described education as government's
most important duty precisely because "it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values."20
Despite its importance, however, education through the exercise of
authority and the insistence upon obedience is risky business. Given the
universality of compulsory education in America,21 state-sponsored
education necessarily raises important questions about government's proper
role in controlling thought and expression and, thereby, in molding
character in a democratic society. An abusive government might use
schools to induce captive22 and immature children uncritically to accept
values that support and enhance the status quo.23 Such government action
e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC. CATHOLIC. AND
PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED 186-87 (1982).
"s Hafen, Schools,supra note 16, at 619 (emphasis added).
19 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
' Id. at 493. The policy of inculcating community values through education has ancient and
respected roots in Western thought. Plato. for instance, proposed censoring the stories that
teachers told so that children would not assimilate "opinions for the most part contrary to those
that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up.- PLATO, THE
REPUBLIC, bk. II, ch. VII. at 177 (Paul Shorey trans., 1930). Aristotle believed that legislators
could produce good citizens by instilling in them virtuous habits from childhood. See ARISTOTLE,
THE NICOMACHEON ETHICS, bk. II, ch. I, at 71 (Harris Rackam trans., 1939). This notion that
instilling morality-building character-is a vital function of education has continued into modern
times. See, e.g., DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, THE EDUCATION OF A CHRISTIAN PRINCE 212-13 (L.
Born trans., 1936): JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION 90 (R. Quick ed.,
1913). The attitude regarding character enhancement has thrived in the United States. See
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979) (asserting that education is foundation of
citizenship, preparing children for public responsibility, professional training, and cultural
appreciation). One hundred and fifty-five years ago de Tocqueville observed: "In the United
States politics are the end and aim of education." Richard L. Berkman. Students in Court: Free
Speech and the Functions of Schooling in America, 40 HARV. EDUC. REV. 567, 569 (1970)
(citation omitted) (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville).
2 Since 1918, all states have required that children within a specified age group attend
school. ROBERT M. O'NEIL, CLASSROOMS IN THE CROSSFIRE 59 (1981).
2 Of course, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 525 (1925). the Court recognized
a parent's right to place her child in a private school. That right, however, may have little
significance for a parent who cannot afford private education or who independently values the
social interaction of public education.
I Mark G. Yudof. Librar. Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the
Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 540 (1984) [hereinafter Yudof, Library Book Selection].
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may severely undermine the ability of individuals to judge independently
and intelligently. Consequently, schools easily might subvert the very core
justifications of the First Amendment.24
The dilemma of public education is thus manifest. Because few
institutions affect young, impressionable personalities as profoundly as do
our schools,25 we as a community are justifiably concerned that our
educational program should promote the "right" skills and values for the
development of an individual capable of contributing in a meaningful way
to our community. Yet by authorizing schools to develop this "right"
environment, we leave our children highly vulnerable to "village ty-
rants"' who might pervert the education process. Under the guise of
properly educating the young, government could predispose children to
accept and defer to authority while passively adopting prevailing values and
current attitudes.27 The school system, consequently, epitomizes the
tension between liberty and authority.
B. Tinker's Aftermath
Over the twenty-five years since Tinker, many have questioned
whether the Court's response to this tension was too one-sided, too
supportive of liberty.' Although Tinker has never been overruled, its
"The power to teach, inform, and lead," cautions Provost Yudof, "is also the power to
indoctrinate, distort judgment, and perpetuate the current regime." Mark G. Yudof, When
Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57
TEX. L. REV. 863, 865 (1979) [hereinafter Yudof, When Governments Speak].
I As Stephen Arons warns: "If the government were able to use schooling to regulate the
development of ideas and opinions by controlling the transmission of culture and the socialization
of children, freedom of expression would become a meaningless right. . . . " STEPHEN ARONS,
COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING 206 (1983).
_ In fact, in many ways public schools are an indoctrinator's dream. See Steven Shiffrin.
Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565. 647 (1980). First, attendance is compulsory, and
students lack the independent knowledge or psychological sophistication necessary to evaluate
critically what their teachers tell them. Second, public schools can disguise their message as
highly valued "education" rather than less trustworthy propaganda. Third. the adult teacher's
authority and seemingly vast fund of knowledge will likely impress the children. Finally, teachers
reward and punish students according to how well they learn the lesson of the day. See Yudof,
When Governments Speak, supra note 23, at 875.
2 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
- Cf. Robert D. Kamenshine, The FirstAmendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause,
67 CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1104 (1979) (proposing that courts interpret First Amendment to prohibit
political establishment in order to alleviate government's power to indoctrinate citizens).
For an exhaustive work on the subject of government's role as communicator and educator,
see MARK YUDOF. WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
1 See, e.g., Hafen, Schools, supra note 16, at 613 ("This seemingly unqualified holding left
lower courts in considerable doubt about the right of schools to control curriculum-related
1995]
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significance has been severely eroded, perhaps as a reaction to this
criticism. The legal trend is unmistakably toward increasing deference to
the decisions of school administrators.29 By providing First Amendment
rights to students only "in light of the special characteristic of the school
environment,"3° Tinker essentially sowed the seeds of its own virtual
demise. The italicized language above easily justifies judicial reluctance to
second-guess the day-to-day judgments rendered by those represented as
uniquely trained and experienced in educating our young.3' If, for
example, alternative educational philosophies support greatly differing
degrees of student participation and creative inquiry, on what basis are
courts to choose and mandate one approach over another? Judges may
understandably question whether their legal training adequately qualifies
them to determine the "educational suitability"32 of various teaching
techniques and materials. Judges, therefore, may feel ill-equipped to police
public education.3 Supervising compliance with a decree to desegregate
is one thing, but regularly reviewing the orchestration of the school
environment is quite another.
Two Supreme Court cases illustrate the extent to which emphasis has
expression that was not disruptive.").
I See Stuart L. Leviton, Is Anyone Listening to Our Students? A Plea for Respect and
Inclusion, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 38 (1993) (discussing use of lower court rhetoric to
support increasing deference to school administrators and resulting narrowing of students' rights):
see also Roger J.R. Levesque, International Children's Rights Grow Up: ImplicationsforAmeri-
can Jurisprudence and Domestic Policy, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193. 208 (1994) (discussing
trend of U.S. courts to limit rights of students by deferring to discretion of school administrators).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added).
31 For a discussion of the societal threat posed by those claiming that their expertise insulates
their judgment from societal review, see infra text accompanying notes 179-86 and note 183. See
also Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy": Value Training in
the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 34-37 [hereinafter Ingber, Socialization]
(questioning educators' insistence on choosing curricula because of claims of specialized training
and experience).
32 "Educational suitability" was deemed by the Court as an acceptable criterion for a school
board to use when determining whether a given book review could remain in the school library.
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 857 (1982) (plurality opinion). In Pico, the Court imposed
constitutional limits on a school board's discretion to remove books from junior and senior high
school libraries. Id. at 869. Although such removals are found unlawful when based on
"narrowly partisan or political" motivations, deletions are "perfectly permissible" when based
on determinations of educational suitability. Id. at 870-71. Educational suitability, however, may
be even harder for a jurist to identify than is obscenity. Yet when discussing obscenity, one
Justice confessed that all he could state with assurance was that "I know it when I see it."
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
11 E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 114 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (asserting
that courts lack ability to supervise "the curriculum of every public school in every hamlet and
city in the United States").
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again been placed on upholding the authority of school officials when these
officials are confronted by student speech activities. In Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser,' the Court upheld a three-day suspension of
a high school student who used "an elaborate, graphic, and explict sexual
metaphor" while delivering a speech before a school assembly to nominate
a fellow classmate for a student government position. 35 Although the
Court repeatedly spoke of public education's role in inculcating "'funda-
mental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system,""' it recognized that First Amendment freedoms nevertheless had
to be "balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."37  More
importantly, the majority concluded that "[t]he determination of what
manner of speech in the classroom or in the school assembly is inappropri-
ate properly rests with the school board."3' Most telling in Bethel was the
Court's acceptance of the proposition that learning obedience to authority
was fundamental to the initiation of the child into the community and to her
preparation for citizenship.39
Bethel left uncertain whether this constraint on student expression
applied to contexts beyond that of offensive vulgarity.' The Court
clarified this issue two years later in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.4' In Hazelwood, the Court relied on Bethel to affirm school
officials' broad authority over all school-sponsored expressive activities.42
The school newspaper at Hazelwood East High School was part of a
journalism course which was a "regular classroom activit[y]" for which the
students received academic credit.43 The journalism teacher exercised
considerable control over the newspaper, including selecting its editors,
setting publication dates, editing stories, and assigning story ideas." The
'4 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
3- Id. at 677-78.
-36 Id. at 683 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick. 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
11 Id. at 681 (emphasis added). This language paved the way for school boards to consider
enacting speech codes either prohibiting hateful comments or mandating political correctness.
Although I find this conclusion troubling, there is an extent to which I believe Bethel's rationale
compelling. See infra text accompanying notes 261-69.
. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683.
3 Id. ("The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined
to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values
of a civilized social order.").
I Hafen, Schools, supra note 16, at 613.
4, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
42 Id. at 266-67.
4- Id. at 268.
44 Id.
1995]
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school principal reviewed every issue prior to publication.45 When the
principal excised two pages from the newspaper after performing a pre-
publication review, three student staff members sued, alleging that their
First Amendment rights had been violated.' The principal defended his
actions on the grounds that the deleted pages contained two articles-one
describing the experiences of pregnant students, the other discussing the
impact of divorce on students at the school-that impinged on the privacy
rights of parents and pregnant students.47 Using language that swept
significantly beyond that necessary to uphold the principal's actions, the
Court proclaimed that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."I
Hence, Hazelwood, together with Bethel, establishes a huge category
of student speech to which Tinker no longer applies: "school-sponsored
expressive activities."49  Neither case, however, questioned Tinker's
insistence that schools are to prepare students for self-governance as
members of a democratic polity. Instead, they portrayed their holdings as
creating the structure and order needed to educate and create the enlight-
ened citizenry whose existence is a prerequisite to self-government.'
They adhered to the belief, expressed earlier by Justice Powell, that
"[legal restrictions on minors. . . may be important to the child's chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding. '
Unfortunately, the Hazelwood Court failed to properly consider the
41 Id. at 269.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263-64.
4 Id. at 274-75. The principal made this argument even though the pregnant students had
agreed to discuss their experiences, and the article used fictitious names. Id. at 263. The
principal's concern was that, because there were few pregnant students, the personal information
in the article would reveal the identity of the students. Id. at 274.
s Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
4 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
The relationship between democracy and education was understood clearly by our nation's
founding generation. Thomas Jefferson. for example, concluded that "illuminat[ing] the minds
of the people" was the most effective means of preventing those with power-even in the best of
governmental forms-from -perverting it into tyranny." Thomas Jefferson, Bill for the More
General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779). quoted in EVA T.H. BRANN, PARADOXES OF EDUCATION
IN A REPUBLIC 40-41 (1979).
"' Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979). Similarly, Professor Hafen stated that
"children have a special need to submit themselves . . . to the yoke of educational demands in




fact that children gain more than information and skills from school. They
also learn socially accepted patterns of behavior and role expectations.
Thus, beyond authority and obedience, students also must be exposed to
liberty-the experience of liberty-if they are to be forged into contributing
members of a democratic polity. The paradox in granting liberty to
children stems from the realization that society must indoctrinate children
so that they may be capable of autonomy. The centrality of this paradox
to the mission of education has been forgotten in recent years.
II. THE SUBTLETIES OF LIBERTY
Appreciating the importance of preparing children to experience
liberty, without condemning order, requires a subtle understanding of
liberty in general. Yet one's understanding of liberty may be influenced
by the ideological perspective used when analyzing the concept.
A. Two Alternative Political Perspectives: An Historical Approach
Even during our nation's founding era, many political leaders
recognized the interplaying roles of autonomy, responsibility and obedience
in the development of liberty. 2 Embraced in this recognition was the
insight that liberty or freedom could too easily degenerate into what
eighteenth-century thinkers called license or licentiousness. 3 Licentious-
ness, it was feared, could threaten the very existence of the new nation by
sapping its economic and political strength, "leaving its people too weak
52 See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 148-49
(1994) (discussing James Madison's concerns of preserving will and autonomy of majority).
I' Jeremiah Atwater, the first president of Middlebury College, cautioned the assembled
Vermont legislature in 1801 that "[l]ibeny. if considered as a blessing, must be taken in a
qualified sense. The freedom which it implies, must be a limited, not [an] absolute freedom...
for the very idea of government always supposes some restraint." Jeremiah Atwater, A Sermon,
in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760-1805. at 1170, 1172
(Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). John Locke, one of the inspirations for the
American experiment with republican government, wrote that "[fireedom ... is not ... [a]
liberty for every one to do what he lists, [or] to live as he pleases." JOHN LOCKE, TvO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 301-02 (Peter Laslett ed., critical ed. 1960) (3d ed. 1698).
Benjamin Rush, a noted Philadelphia doctor and educator, commented in 1787: "In our opposition
to monarchy, we forgot that the temple of tyranny has two doors. We bolted one of them by
proper restraints; but we left the other open, by neglecting to guard against the effects of our own
ignorance and licentiousness." Benjamin Rush, An Address (1787), quoted in FORREST
MCDONALD, NOvUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 3
(1985). For a contemporary perspective on the interrelationship between liberty and respon-
sibility. see LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION OF
CITIZENSHIP 43 (1986) ("Those who are free of responsibility for themselves cannot be free to
make their own way in society.").
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and dissolute to repel corruption from within or invaders from without."'
Thus, the compelling challenge of the age "was to make authority and
liberty compatible."55
To respond to this challenge, Americans drew on two competing
visions of social order. One vision, embodied by the liberal tradition of the
Enlightenment 6 and embraced by the federalists,57 emphasized the
individualism of people acting in society, and examined how social
institutions rest on and constrain individual preferences. 8 Each person
was viewed as a distinct unit.5 9 Autonomy and separation were empha-
sized; relationships among individuals were secondary.' According to
this tradition, the purpose of the community was simply to give individuals
the needed security (i.e. freedom) to pursue their private interests. So
viewed, liberty was the extent to which the individual, once assured of this
minimum level of security, was left unrestricted by the state. 61
The alternative vision, drawing on the tradition of civic republican-
ism,62 emphasized the essential social nature of individuals. This
I Suzanna Sherry. Without Virtue There Can be No Liberty, 78 MINN. L. REV. 61. 62-63
(1993).
-5 JAY FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST
PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY 1750-1800, at 14 (1982).
-6 See 1 PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION, THE RISE OF MODERN
PAGANISM 3-27 (1966) (discussing intellectual climate of European Enlightenment giving birth
to views of many American political thinkers of era).
-7 See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
1 This analysis of the liberal tradition is drawn primarily from LOUIS HARTZ. THE LIBERAL
TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955) and C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
"' Theorists emphasizing our separateness included: THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 110
(Liberal Arts Press ed., 1958) (1651) ("The condition of man. . . is a condition of war of every
one against every one . . . ."), JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 296 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1967) (3d ed. 1698) ("[AII men are naturally in [the] State [of nature], and remain
so, till by their own consent they make themselves Members of some Politick Society . . . .).
For an account of the central role of individualism in the seventeenth century English thought that
shaped Western political philosophy, see MACPHERSON, supra note 58.
60 DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 51 (1977); MICHAEL J. SANDEL.
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 133 (1982).
61 Accordingly, public liberty was viewed as synonymous with individual liberty. GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 63 (1969), Stanley N.
Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON.
467, 482 (1976). Because the interest of the community was equated with the aggregate of
individual interests, the prosperity of the nation increased in conjunction with increased freedom
of individuals to pursue their own desires.
6 See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 462 (1975): CAROLINE ROBBINS. THE EIGH-
TEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE TRANSMISSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM THE RESTORATION OF CHARLES II UNTIL
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perspective-embraced most fully by the anti-federalists who feared large,
impersonal and powerful government 63-rejected the individualism of the
Enlightenment and focused instead on republican theorists dating back to
ancient Greece and the Italian city-states.' Republicanism perceived
people as gaining an understanding of their lives from participation and
interaction with others in a social world that they jointly created.'
Consequently, the assumption was that people were shaped by the
institutions in which they functioned; the central theme was connection
rather than autonomy.6  Society preceded the individual, for self-
knowledge was possible only with reference to the social matrix within
which individuals found themselves.67 Institutions of social life, there-
fore, were important because they forged the character of citizens.6" It
was the responsibility of these institutions to promote "civic virtue"-a
capacity to overcome private passion, or appetite, in public decision-
THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN COLONIES (1959), GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE
FEDERALIST (1981); WOOD, supra note 61.
6 See generally HERBERT J. STORING. WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (Murray
Dry ed., 1981). Although, the "home" of republican thought in American constitutionalism may
have been in the work of the anti-federalists, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1547 (1, 88), many republican themes existed in federal thought as
well. H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1705 (1988). The
philosophical distinction between the federalists and anti-federalists was not one of total opposition
but one of emphasis and degree. See Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful. 97 YALE
L.J. 1663, 1666-67 & n.13 (1988).
64 See Richard A. Epstein, Modem Republicanism-Or the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE
L.J. 1633, 1634 (1988).
65 According to this tradition, "man was by nature a political being, a citizen who achieved
his greatest moral fulfillment by participating in a self-governing republic." Gordon S. Wood,
Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution, 66 CI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 23 (1990).
6 Theoretical works accepting this social nature of humanity included: ADAM FERGUSON,
AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 4 (Duncan Forbes ed., 1966) (1767) (arguing that
"[m]ankind are to be taken in group[s], as they have always subsisted" and that -[t]he history of
the individual is but a detail of the sentiments and thoughts he has entertained in the view of his
species"); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 485 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1967)
("'Tis by society alone [man] is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equality
with his fellow-creatures .... ).
67 See Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins ofAmerican Constitutionalism, 98 YALE
L.J. 449, 517 (1989) ("[A]s a member of a particular discursive community, the individual
simultaneously creates both his own individual identity and that of the community.").
63 This perspective insisted that we each define and understand ourselves through personal
attachments. We acquire our values through the interplay of innumerable influences of family,
friends, neighbors, church, schools, cultural figures, and others. See Duncan Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209, 211-12 (1979). Human
individuality is formed through processes of language, thought, and feeling, which naturally and
necessarily include other persons.
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making. 69  A virtuous citizenry was one that had learned from its
institutions that the public good differed from the aggregate of private
preferences.7" For such a citizenry, liberty consisted of a process of
seeking and structuring a shared telos, consisting of a common value
system for citizen and community.7' The quintessential public institutions
were those that allowed individuals to experience liberty through an
ongoing process of self-determination.'
B. The Constitutional Concept of "Right"
Given these differing conceptions of liberty,73 it is significant that it
was the anti-federalists (rather than the federalists), with their commitment
to this republican orientation, who were the force that galvanized support
for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. 74
Viewing society as a teacher-a molder of character-rather than just a
69 As one pair of scholars remarked. "Good republican government might transform
individuals: good liberal (Lockean) government merely protected them. " DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY. A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 13 (1990).
70 A virtuous citizen had an independent mind and a willingness to use it for the good of the
community. Virtue meant taking responsibility for oneself and one's community. Virtue also
meant letting reason control passion, and letting long-term community interests override selfish
individual wants. Citizens in a virtuous republic deliberated rationally about what would best
serve the interests of the community. For republicans, governmental decisions were not mere
responses to private interests, but were efforts to decide upon and implement communal values.
See JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 13-33 (1978). Rather than Locke. the philosophical
emphasis was on Rousseau, see JUDITH N. SHKLAR. MEN AND CITIZENS: A STUDY OF
ROUSSEAU'S SOCIAL THEORY 104 (1969) (discussing Rousseau's preoccupation with republican
governments), Machiavelli, see generally POCOCK, supra note 61, and Aristotle. see ERNEST
BARKER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 295 (1959) (describing Aristotle's
concept of citizenship as participation in political decision-making).
"I See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981); see also JANE J.
MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 26-28 (1980) (describing development of
common interests in political community); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 1-21 (1970) (commenting on political and communal values of democratic society).
72 See HANNA ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 248-55 (1963): DAVID HELD. MODELS OF
DEMOCRACY 186-220 (1987). For republicans, individual fulfillment came from "sharing in a
collective autonomy, a collective freedom and glory." HANNA PITKIN. FORTUNE IS A WOMAN:
GENDER AND POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI 81 (1984).
7- Isaiah Berlin's distinction between "negative" and "positive" liberty captured the essential
difference between liberty under individualism, as embraced by the federalists, and liberty under
republicanism, as embraced by the anti-federalists. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty. in
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 118-35 (1969).
74 See STORING. supra note 63, at 64 ("It is often said that the major legacy of the Anti-
Federalists is the Bill of Rights.").
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regulator of conduct,75 the anti-federalists believed that the proposed
Constitution inadequately accounted for this character-building role. An
important component of their argument for a federal bill of rights was the
role they hoped the document would play in providing the political and
moral education necessary for the development of a virtuous citizenry.76
This history should cause us to question the common contemporary
perception that constitutional rights are designed solely to secure the
interests of individuals, most commonly the interest of personal autonomy,
by respecting individual choice.' A more subtle comprehension of these
rights reveals that they may serve multiple purposes. Of course, in order
for a right to be enforced through litigation, some individual must be
privileged to claim it. Nevertheless, rights not only encompass individual-
istic values but those that are interpersonal or communal as well. 78 The
individual, therefore, may possess that right only, or at least partially, in
an agency or fiduciary capacity, thus, protecting the interests of others or
the polity in general.
The multifarious functioning of constitutional rights is clearly apparent
in the context of the First Amendment right to free speech. The argument
'- Anti-federalist Melancton Smith captured this spirit when he said:
Government operates upon the spirit of the people, as well as the spirit of the people
operates upon it-and if they are not conformable to each other, the one or the other
will prevail.. . . Our duty is to frame a government friendly to liberty and the rights
of mankind, which will tend to cherish and cultivate a love of liberty among our
citizens.
Melancton Smith, Address Delivered in the Course of Debate by the Convention of the State of
New York on the Adoption of the Federalist Constitution (June 21. 1788). reprinted in 6 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 155, 160-61 (Herbert J. Storing ed.. 1981).
76 One anti-federalist insisted that a bill of rights would provide "the first lesson of the young
citizens becoming men, to sustain the dignity of their being." 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 273.
77 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-1, at 1302 (2d
ed. 1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REV.
177, 187 (1983). Most contemporary "rights-based" theories of constitutional law are centered
around concern for upholding individual action. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 127 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978) (arguing that liberalism
supposes that individuals must be free to choose own vision of "good life").
The seminal defense of rights theory is contained in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977). An assessment of the role of rights theory can be found in Peter Westen, The
Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights", 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 977-78 (1986) ("The language of 'rights'
has become the rhetoric of choice in our society for asserting moral and legal claims.").
I See Seth F. Kreimer. Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1389 (1984) (contending that constitutional rights protect values
other than individual choice); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1415, 1490 (1989) (stating that "constitutional liberties ... do not simply protect individual
rightholders piecemeal").
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against censorship is often stated in terms of autonomy, and attributes to
free speech an overriding purpose of respecting and protecting an
individual's absolute freedom of thought and conscience necessary to
promote self-realization and self-expression.79 Speech, however, is not
the only means by which these autonomy-based interests can be served.
They may be furthered through virtually all voluntary conduct, including
one's choice of profession, dress, and consumer goods. s8 Consequently,
a recognition of the social importance of free speech is necessary to explain
why speech has been singled out for constitutional protection.
The often-used metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas" encapsulates
the interpersonal or systemic interests of free speech, resting as much on
its importance to the receiver of any message as it does to the communica-
tor."' This perspective of free speech interests has two component parts.
The first assumes that a process of robust debate, if uninhibited by
governmental interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least
to the best perspectives on solutions for social problemsY The second
component emphasizes the social value of an informed citizenry acting as
sovereign overseeing governmental action.83 Proponents of this latter
" Some commentators assert that autonomy is the singular-or at least the primary-justi-
fication for free speech. See, e.g., Charles Fried. The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A
Threat to Liberty., 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992); Martin H. Redish. The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
1 "An individual may develop his faculties ... from trading in the stock market, following
his profession as a riverport pilot, working as a barmaid, engaging in sexual activity, playing
tennis, rigging prices or in any of thousands of other endeavors." Robert H. Bork. Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971): see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 303-04 (1992).
Si See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-68 (1982) (emphasizing student's
"right to receive information and ideas"): Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) (claiming that interests of recipients of speech rather than that of communicator are
paramount for First Amendment purposes). The core insight of the Red Lion case, which upheld
the FCC's Fairness Doctrine against constitutional attack by broadcasters, was that the interest
in legally protected private autonomy from government is not always connected with the interest
of democratic self-governance. Id. at 392-93.
12 Although this classic image of competing ideas and robust debate dates back to English
philosophers John Milton, see John Milton, Aeropagitica (London 1644). in THE PROSE OF JOHN
MILTON 265 passim (J. Max Patrick ed., 1967), and John Stuart Mill, see JOHN STUART MILL.
ON LIBERTY 15-71 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978), Justice Holmes first introduced this concept
into American jurisprudence in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919), stating that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J.. dissenting).
83 See Kenneth L. Karst, Equaliy as a Central Principle in the First Amendment. 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 20, 23-25 (1975). See generally Vincent Blasi. The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 523, 529-44 (1977) (stating that free expression is check
against abuse of official power).
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conception insist that the best decisions can be reached in a democracy only
if the citizenry is fully aware of the issues involved, the options available,
and the interests or values at stake.84
Yet for many, these interpersonal or systemic functions of free speech
do not explain the need to safeguard extremist or hateful communication
such as the anti-semitic message of the Nazis. Few, for example, were
willing to credit the Nazis who wished to march through Skokie, Illi-
nois,' with expanding the menu of views from which individuals choose
their truths. 86  Such a strong commitment to free speech may be more
fully explained by another set of interests-communal interests. Through
our legal response to speech activity, we create a social identity that
reflects and embodies the aspirations and values of the community. The
protection of the Skokie march thus can be viewed as a collective,
self-disciplinary exercise in communal tolerance.8
The communal interest in free speech, therefore, need not be based on
the skeptic's fear of the fallibility of governmental attempts to identify
truth. Rather, it is based on a desire to nurture certain character traits in
the polity. Free speech seeks to make people courageous, resilient, and
tolerant. It attempts to create a polity willing to stake confidence and
resolve against deviance and dissent, one that is unafraid to hear the worst
that can be said about its own moral and cognitive situations.' So
e See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 88 (1948) (asserting that First Amendment's primary purpose is to give every
voting citizen fullest possible understanding of problems with which members of self-governing
society must deal).
I See National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie. 434 U.S. 1327 (1977) (denying
stay); National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam):
Collin v. Smith. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953, and cert. denied. 439 U.S.
916 (1978). See generally David Goldberger, Skokie: The First Amendment Under Attack by its
Friends. 29 MERCER L. REV. 761, 772 (1978) (stating that committment to Bill of Rights can be
"peeled away, one supporting group at a time").
e6 Holmes argued that all views, even those we detest, need to be given the opportunity to
succeed in the marketplace. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Unsurprisingly, the Jewish community of Skokie questioned why the arguments of
anti-semitism and genocide should be offered such an opportunity. For many, the contention that
unrestricted expression of the precepts of Nazism must be protected because we cannot know
whether such ideas are actually false is both unpersuasive and offensive. See DONALD A. DOWNS,
NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 32 (1985) (estimating
that ACLU lost 30,000 members-15% of its total membership-and $500,000 per year in
contributions because of defense of Nazis' right to march through Skokie).
87 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 198-200 (1986).
1 Thus, free speech presently builds character through both the experience of communicating
and that of reacting to communication. In the very act of talking, values such as power, en-
lightenment, skill, affection, respect, health and well-being are latently shaped and shared. Social
structures that foster active involvement can cultivate qualities essential to a democratic society,
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viewed, the emphasis of the First Amendment shifts from the value of the
speech, as represented by the interpersonal interest in information
exchange, to the value of the response, as represented by the communal
interest in tolerance.89 Tolerance becomes a means through which society
communicates and affirms its own principles, thereby creating a sense of
community.' The deep structure of this character-based argument,
therefore, is collectivist and communitarian, rather than individualistic.
C. The Importance of Intermediary Institutions
Despite the availability of this more subtle, holistic approach to
liberty, the civic republican language of community has all but disappeared
from the lexicon of rights.91  Instead, the rhetoric of liberal political
philosophy-a philosophy which posits individuals capable of freely
choosing among values without constraint-provides the bedrock from
which our modern commitment to liberty, including free speech, arises.92
qualities such as self-confidence, inquisitiveness, and a willingness to question authority. See
PATEMEN, supra note 71, at 45-66 (examining positive correlation between participation and sense
of political efficacy).
But perhaps of even greater importance, a strong doctrine of free expression has its greatest
effect on the character of those who possess the power to control speech. They are required to
be more tolerant and respectful of individual integrity, more open to change, and more
accustomed to, or less fearful of, challenge.
" See Suzanna Sherry, An Essay Concerning Toleration, 71 MINN. L. REV. 963, 976 (1987)
(describing contribution of scholarship of Lee Bollinger in understanding value of free speech).
' See Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values. 92 YALE L.J. 438, 460 (1983)
(noting community is created and defined through tolerance). In this light, it is revealing to
compare the opinion of Justice Holmes in Gitlow v. New York. 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925)
(Holmes, J.. dissenting), emphasizing the importance of offering even extremist speech a chance
to succeed in the marketplace, with that of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring). In this landmark opinion. Justice Brandeis cautioned
that "repression breeds hate . . . ." Id. at 375. This phrase can be read as a double-entendre.
Brandeis was concerned not only with the hate experienced by dissidents, but also with the hate
experienced by those with power to punish dissent. The passage is not primarily about
consequences or tactics; it is about character. For Brandeis. tolerance was an act of civic courage.
See Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 691 (1988) (-The courageous attitude,
Brandeis asserts, is that of receptivity to new arrangements and new ways of thinking.").
"' There has been, however, somewhat of a revival of republican philosophy in present social
theory. See, e.g., Symposium, The Republican Civil Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988)
(symposium on civil republicanism).
'2 See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication.
72 VA. L. REV. 543, 544-45 (1986) (asserting that present paradigm of political and moral
philosophy is individualist). For many. individualism is the foundation upon which our
constitutional commitment to free speech is built. Id. "Individualism lies at the very core of
American culture," writes one group of scholars. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL.. HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 142 (1985). "We believe in the
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But by asserting that individuals are independent and self-sufficient
originators of their own ideas and beliefs-that they exist free of cultural
context-the individualist perspective denies the community's role in both
shaping and reflecting an individual's values.93 Thus, individualism
provides an unrealistic account of our moral existence; individuals cannot
be separated from the community in which they reside.
94
Yet even with this realization of the importance of "community," the
concept is problematic in today's large and heterogeneous state. The
community which now structures the individual's sense of self and
dominates the process of character building can no longer be equated with
the state. Today, the obligation of character development essentially falls
on intermediate level institutions or social groupings situated somewhere
between the isolated individual and the distant, and often abstract, state.'
These groups and institutions, such as civic and voluntary organizations,
social and recreational clubs, churches, workplaces, schools, families and
neighborhoods, with their face-to-face interplay among members, serve as
dignity, indeed the sacredness, of the individual. Anything that would violate our right to think
for ourselves, judge for ourselves, make our own decisions, live our lives as we see fit, is not
only morally wrong, it is sacrilegious." Id.
9- See MACPHERSON. supra note 58, at 263-64; David A.J. Richards, SexualAutonomy and
the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 976 (1979) (discussing foundation of constitutional morali-
ty).
9 In spite of our best efforts, we can never truly extricate ourselves from the influence of
our cultural milieu. As historian Isaiah Berlin notes:
For am I not what I am, to some degree. in virtue of what others think and feel me to
be? When I ask myself what I am, and answer: an Englishman, a Chinese, a merchant.
a man of no importance, a millionaire, a convict-I find upon analysis that to possess
these attributes entails being recognized as belonging to a particular group or class by
other persons in my society, and that this recognition is part of the meaning of most
of the terms that denote some of my most personal and permanent characteristics. I am
not disembodied reason. Nor am I Robinson Crusoe. alone upon his island. It is not
only that my material life depends upon interaction with other men, or that I am what
I am as a result of social forces, but that some, perhaps all, of my ideas about myself,
in particular my sense of my own moral and social identity, are intelligible only in
terms of the social network in which I am . . .an element.
Berlin. supra note 73, at 155.
9- An early commentator on American society was struck by the abundance and importance
of these intermediate institutions. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114-28
(Phillips Bradley ed., 1945). "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly
form associations." ld. at 114. Justice Brennan heralded voluntary associations as "critical buffers
between the individual and the power of the State." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 619 (1984). Bruce Hafen has also written extensively of the importance of intermediate
institutions, what he calls -mediating institutions." Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student
Erpression Through InstitutionalAuthority: Public Schools As Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 663, 696 (1987) [hereinafter Hafen, Developing Student Erpression].
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the situs of a majority of those experiences which give moral and
intellectual meaning to our world.96 They are the true bases and bear the
primary responsibility for social integration and the formation of ideals and
beliefs.' Essentially, character development is the responsibility of an
individual's interactive community.
Thus, character-building depends on lessons gained in the interplay of
daily life. Without day-to-day opportunities for meaningful participation
in microsettings, people will not develop the relevant skills and attitudes
desirable within the community, and may lack a sense of their ability to
make a difference in broader political arenas.98 It is, therefore, the
6 See Grant McConnell, The Public Values of the Private Association, in NoMos XI:
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 147, 149 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.. 1969)
(noting that private associations "build norms and patterns of behavior"): Richard B. Stewart.
Organizational Jurisprudence. 101 HARV. L. REV. 371, 380-84 (1987) (describing alternative
normative conceptions of intermediate organizations) (reviewing MEIR DAN-COHEN. RIGHTS,
PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986)).
If we are to recognize the importance of these intermediate groups in relation to character
building, we also must be aware of the danger. The more one's sense of self is tied to one's role
in these institutions that incorporate face-to-face contact, the more coercive pressure to conform
these groups exercise. Consequently, for some, these small -governing" units represent the
greatest danger to individual liberty. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10. at 77-79 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (expressing fear of coercive power of small groups).
' These small-scale institutions can serve as "private boot camps for citizenship ...
serv[ing] not as havens for the dominant culture, but as vehicles for teaching the primacy of the
common good, writ small." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713,
1720 (1988). Some urge that, because of the opportunities for greater participation, feelings of
attachment, and common purpose, these smaller associations can give their members a sense of
interdependence in the creation of the meanings that give life to the institution. Thus, they can
provide the experience of acting for the public good. See Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners
Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589. 1600-01 (1982).
1 See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Ingber. Rediscover-
ing].
What [most people] fail to recognize is that for most Americans those contexts of
greatest First Amendment protection [voting, participation in protest marches.
demonstrations, picketing, and leafletting] are tangential to their daily lives. Most of
us probably would feel sheepish if the degree to which we take advantage of and
experiance the opportunity to express our opinions or exercise independent thought
were assessed. Mark Twain's notorious comment regarding the practical impact upon
individuals of our present legal protection of speech behavior retains its sting: "It is by
the goodness of God that in ourt country we have those three unspeakably precious
things: freedom of speech. freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice
either of them."
Id. at 49 (footnotes omitted) (quoting MARK TWAIN. FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR 196 (1987)). A
system which protects speech only in contexts experienced by few will have little effect on
character the development of the citizenry. See also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism:
Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 192 (1995) (discussing importance of First
Amendment freedoms in "education for republican citizenship").
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structure society imposes upon day-to-day intercourse that creates the habits
of interaction, socializes proper role expectations, and communicates subtly
but powerfully those values for which the community stands.99 Each of
us are constructed by the social setting in which we find ourselves,
determining our attitudes towards such factors as hierarchy, expertise,
creativity and independence."
Consequently, we must give considerable attention to the vital lessons
learned in these mundane contexts, for I believe that it is within these
settings that character is actually built and values inculcated. If responsible
freedom cannot be fostered in these day-to-day contexts, then a political
community built on civic virtue and courage is an impossible dream.''
Intermediate institutions are integral to the fulfillment of First Amendment
concerns; they serve both as the boot camp and the front line in the effort
to forge the character of a democratic polity.0 2
Unfortunately, this insight is missing from the Supreme Court's recent
willingness to minimize free speech experiences in public school set-
tings-settings vital to the creation of who we are as individuals, and what
we care and stand for as a community.
III. EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP
A. Children and Liberty
If constitutional rights presently are based on the rhetoric of individu-
alism, 3 it is not surprising that the individual interests encompassed by
11 Other authors have recognized the character-building or communal value of communicative
freedom. See, e.g., BOLLINGER, supra note 87; Sherry. supra note 92. They see First
Amendment jurisprudence as playing a largely educative role. Through our legal response to
speech activity, they believe we create a social identity that reflects and embodies the aspirations
and values of the community. See MEIKLEIOHN, supra note 84, at 58 ("The Supreme Court. we
have said, is and must be one of our most effective teachers. It is, in the last resort, an accredited
interpreter to us of our own intentions.").
" See Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1628 (1988) ("[T]he methods or habits of 'constitutional thinking' likely
cannot be developed on the spur of the moment.").
,0I The values a community hopes its citizens exude, therefore, must be embodied in the
community's institutional arrangements. Consequently, it is submitted that if we exclude institu-
tional settings from First Amendment coverage, the concept of a society founded on virtuous.
popular participation is likely to remain unfamiliar and foreign, perforce making its attainment
unrealistic. If we are trained in our daily lives quietly to accept authority or, alternatively,
enthusiastically to wield authority, we cannot expect to create a polity capable of anything other
than acceptance of an entrenched status quo.
,o See Sullivan, supra note 97, at 1720.
303 See supra text accompanying note 92.
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the First Amendment fare poorly in school settings. Given that individual-
ism posits persons capable of choosing among values without constraint
from others or the state, children surely constitute the "Achilles heel of
liberal ideology." 1" For children, the communal role in character-
building is incontrovertible"°5 because children are not born with a
community allegiance or a particular cultural orientation."° Society must
teach values, thereby molding character, if children are to have conceptions
of the public good as adults. Although the initial source of a child's
self-perception lies with the home and family, once the child begins to
attend school, a major initiative passes beyond the family to the educational
institution. °7 Consequently, many commentators argue that education's
inherent indoctrinative character leaves the First Amendment with no
legitimate role in our public schools. "
One may not simply gloss over the importance of liberty for children,
however, by insisting that because they lack the facility to choose in an
intelligent, rational, and independent manner, children fail to possess "that
full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First
Amendment guarantees."10 9  Regardless of whether one accepts an
"04 Shiffrin, supra note 25, at 647. Others echo Shiffrin's characterization. See, e.g.. Larry
Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue: Man and Manna in the Liberal State, 28 UCLA L.
REV. 816, 855 (1981).
105 Even libertarian John Stuart Mill, in discussing liberty as autonomy, recognized children
as a necessary limit upon his philosophy. MILL. supra note 82. at 9. Little remains of the concept
of unrestrained choice, however, if the educational process may socialize children for 18 years
with the intent of forging "good citizens."
" Yodof. Library Book Selection, supra note 23, at 531.
107 See Jules Henry. Attitude Organization in Elementary School Classrooms, in READINGS
IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION 254 (Werrett W. Charters & Nathaniel L. Gage
eds., 1963) (stating that classroom "does not merely sustain attitudes . . . created in the home.
but reinforces some,. de-emphasizes others, and makes its own contribution"). As children get
older, their peer community and the pop-media culture will also have an effect.
108 See, e.g., JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 51-85, 167 n.29 (1977)
(concluding that state's "teaching power" involves inducting children into community, rendering
notions of children's free speech and state ideological neutrality irrelevant): David A. Diamond.
The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 477 (1981) (contending that schools' indoctrinative function precludes recognizing First
Amendment rights for children); Brian A. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment
Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis. 12 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 24 (1984) (asserting that classroom dialogue facilitates learning process which
includes "value inculcation," instead of forum for free trade of ideas); Stephen R. Goldstein, The
Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976) (stating that scope of indoctrinative interests in public education
precludes in-class activities contrary to wishes of school authorities).
"0 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring). The
argument goes further still, claiming that children need to be protected from the consequences of
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individual or communitarian perspective on the value of speech conduct,
this view begs two fundamental questions: (1) How can young adults
autonomously choose among competing options if they have had little prior
experience with such choice? and (2) How can individuals as adults
exemplify the civic virtues of public-spiritedness, participation, and
tolerance if their experiences during their most formative years inhibit such
traits? Both the individualist and communitarian goals of free speech are
unattainable if societal institutions are structured so as to cultivate
interactive habits in children which are inconsistent with the needs of a
democratic polity."' Students who receive nothing but predigested ideas
throughout their childhood cannot miraculously transform into autonomous,
free-thinking individuals upon reaching adulthood.
Public institutions, of course, are established to fulfill specified
societal needs; schools are established to educate the young. They must be
given the tools and freedom to efficiently fulfill that mission. Part of that
mission, however, is the preparation of students for induction into a
democratic polity. Regardless of the students' readiness for autonomy, our
communitarian goals require that they be exposed to free speech experienc-
es in an environment capable of promoting civic virtue, of character
building. Therefore, we must structure our schools so that they may
succeed not only in the education of citizens but also in the education of
students for citizenship."'
B. The Mission of Education
Citizens who lack education also lack the capacity for meaningful
participation in a democracy. Even during the founding era of the
eighteenth-century, many writers and speakers stressed the necessity of
education, recognizing that an ignorant people cannot sustain freedom."12
their own poor choices. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (commenting that
children "lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them"); see also Bruce C. Hafen, The Learning Years: A Review of The
Changing Legal World of Adolescence, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1045, 1048-49 (1983) [hereinafter
Hafen, The Learning Years] (noting that limitations on choice are "form of protection for minors
... against their own immaturity and against their vulnerability to exploitation by others").
110 Thus, Professor Hafen acknowledges that despite his belief that infants and young children
totally lack the capacity for self-governance, "[a]dolescence ... is another matter." Hafen, The
Learning Years, supra note 109, at 1045.
11 See Sherry, supra note 54, at 77 (distinguishing between education "for" citizenship and
education "of" citizens).
"I In 1782, Zabdiel Adams preached that "[a]n ignorant people will never long live under
a free government. They will soon become slaves." Zabdiel Adams. An Election Sermon (1782),
in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760-1805, supra note 53,
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Thus, education of citizens-education intended to inform and to create
certain skills, including those of communication and comprehension-is
indispensable to the fostering and nourishing of the underlying values of the
First Amendment." 3 Students must gain the capacity to enjoy these free
speech values. They must "receive knowledge," and to do so they may
well have to accept the authority of their teachers." 4
To accomplish these goals, schooling certainly requires a degree of
order and discipline."5  Without it, students may well be denied the
"right" to an effective education. Based on this need to educate citizens,
Professor Hafen concludes that "courts should presume the constitutional
validity of rational decisions by public school officials that implicate
educational matters, both curricular and extracurricular.""16  This
presumption is "grounded in interests associated with students' right to be
taught the values underlying the [F]irst [A]mendment."" 7
As previously stated, however, schools are responsible not only for
education of citizens but also for education for citizenship." 8  Schools
invariably teach values. 119 Thus, Professor Hafen also appreciates that
at 539, 555. In 1799, Samuel Knox wrote that "[i]gnorance . . .has ever been the parent and
stupid nurse of civil slavery .... " Samuel Knox, An Essay On the Best System of Liberal
Education, in ESSAYS ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 271, 288 (Frederick Rudolph ed..
1965). Joel Barlow noted in 1801 that "[i]gnorance is everywhere ... an infallible instrument
of despotism." Letter II from Joel Barlow to His Fellow Citizens of the United States: On Certain
Political Measures Proposed to Their Consideration (1801), in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760-1805, supra note 53, at 1099, 1121.
"' See Hafen, Developing Student Expression, supra note 95, at 669 ("Public education seeks
affirmatively to teach the capacity to enjoy first amendment values--to mediate between ignorance
and educated expression.").
.. Professor Hafen, in fact, describes education as "necessarily [an] authoritarian process.
Hafen, Schools, supra note 16, at 619. He further concludes that the "widespread reduction of
institutional authority in public schools over the past generation is statistically correlated with the
recently publicized declines in the academic achievement of American students.' Hafen.
Hazelwood, supra note 5. at 700.
,,5 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) ("Without first establishing
discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.").
116 Hafen. Developing Student Expression, supra note 95, at 664.
1i1 Id.
118 See supra text accompanying note 111. Although the Supreme Court often mentions
democratic citizenship as one goal of education, see, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser.
478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982), there has been
little or no careful consideration of what an education for citizenship might entail.
"9 Even schools wishing to avoid "value-training" inevitably teach values. Curricularchoices,
such as whether to supply a wood-working shop or to hire a music teacher, convey delicate value
judgments about the purpose of education. Having students read Gabriel Garcia Marquez's novel,
One Hundred Years of Solitude, rather than Geoffrey Chaucer's Miller's Tale, communicates
something about the value of multiculturalism. The very pedagogical style and procedural
environment of the classroom (through students' day-to-day interpersonal experiences with
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schools must commit themselves to initiating students into the normative
culture of our community by transmitting "fundamental civic and moral
virtues such as integrity, cooperation, self-reliance, and responsibility."" 0
Still, a problem exists. Although value transmission is essential for
preparing the student for citizenship, if such indoctrination is too success-
ful, it threatens the development of a democratic personality. Controlling
the system of value transmission is "a hallmark of totalitarianism."''
Thus, any effort to indoctrinate "official" values" is in tension with our
designs to have a democratic polity." The desire to induct children into
their community "must be tempered by the realization that much of what
society achieves depends on individuals who do not or will not conform to
the prevailing wisdom." 24
Herein lies the dilemma. Society must indoctrinate children so they
may be capable of independent, critical thought. Paradoxically, education
teachers, administrators, and other children) instills value positions on matters such as the respect
due authority, the worth of creative or critical thinking, and the tolerance due opposing opinions.
See MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964)
(suggesting that medium itself may be most significant message); see also Galles, A Basement
Tour of the Ivory Tower, GAINESVILLE SUN. June 9. 1989, at 13A (contending that classroom
experiences, rather than formal curricula, provide most significant school lessons). A value-
neutral system is simply inconceivable.
11' Hafen, Developing Student Expression, supra note 95. at 700. Clearly, this was part of
the pressure behind the Court's positions in both Hazelwood and Bethel. See Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (deferring to school official's decision when
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns); Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681 (confirming
school's role in -teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior"). For a fuller
review of both cases, see supra text accompanying notes 34-51.
' ' PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS. To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 6 (1977) (discussing alternative methods to provide
'welfare-state services").
" Webster's Third New lnternationalDictionay defines "indoctrinate" as follows: -to cause
to be impressed and usu. ultimately imbued (as with ... partisan or sectarian opinion, point of
view, or principle) . . .: cause to be drilled or otherwise trained (as in a sectarian doctrine) and
usu. persuaded . . . ." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1153 (1971).
Implicit in the concept of indoctrination is the sense that the individual has been restricted in her
ability to perceive new ideas and to appreciate perspectives contrary to the point of view with
which she has been "imbued."
1' Freedom of speech presupposes that the beliefs and opinions that individuals form are not
the product of deliberate efforts to shape and condition those beliefs to conform with official
policy. To allow officials to inculcate values is to admit that free speech protects expression only
so long as the speaker has been conditioned to say what those in authority accept. In a society
of such preconditioned speakers, freedom of speech is virtually irrelevant. See supra notes 22-27
and accompanying text (noting schools may be used as forum to induce children into adopting
values that enhance status quo); see also text accompanying notes 103-11 (noting that schools play
role of indoctrinating students with values, which may suppress individual choice).
11 Yudof. Library Book Selection, supra note 23, at 530.
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must promote autonomy while simultaneously denying it by shaping and
constraining present and future choices.'5
Resolving this dilemma requires a re-evaluation of the school's
mission as value inculcator. Schools inevitably play a crucial role in the
process by which the young are inducted into society. 126  But this
induction process must ensure that the adults it produces see themselves as
worthy and capable of participating meaningfully in an ongoing process of
collective self-determination. Consequently, if schools are to fulfill their
mission of educating youths for citizenship, the norms embodied in the
First Amendment also must be transmitted. The very impressionability of
children makes it vital that community institutions inculcate within the
young the free speech values which are crucial to the promotion of a
democratic personality. Schools must support free speech not because of
any concern over autonomy, but because of our communal interest in
character development. 127
Accepting this character-building interest, public institutions must
recognize that certain virtues are public goods to be nurtured. Under any
set of social conditions, American democracy will be the poorer if our
public institutions do not foster communal support and indoctrinate the
values of individual dignity, creativity, mutual respect, inquisitiveness,
civic and intellectual courage, and the willingness (on occasion) to question
authority.2 8  Through the experiences of conveying and reacting to
communication, individuals-under a free speech regime-can be socialized
12.5 See ROBERT M. HARE. DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE. PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION 72, 85
(Israel Scheffler ed., 1958); Yudof, Library Book Selection. supra note 23, at 528 (noting
education both promotes and denies autonomy by shaping and constraining one's choices): cf.
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. reprinted in. SELECTED
WRITINGS OF EDMUND BURKE 343, 350-54 (W.J. Bate ed., 1960) (noting paradox in fact that
freedom of choice was necessary for "legal existence of the sovereign magistry" while at same
time laws dictated that king must hold crown by succession).
'2 Indeed, public schools may be "the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which
our society rests."' Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick. 441
U.S. 68. 76 (1979)).
127 People must be socialized to think critically and independently if we wish to deter what
Lee Bollinger referred to as the "obedient mind," a mind unable to think for itself. BOLLINGER.
supra note 87, at 247. Despite Professor Hafen's antipathy to judicial enforcement of student free
speech claims, see Hafen, Developing Student Expression. supra note 95, at 664 (recommending
deference to most decisions of school officials), he appreciates that "[als holders of inchoate
rights of democratic citizenship, students have a high stake in the development of their own
critical powers to act in the future as sovereign citizens." Id. at 707.
2" I believe this idea is to a great extent what Justice Brandeis had in mind in his opinion in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (relating to
governmental system fostering "courageous, self-reliant men"), overruled on other grounds.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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to think (and then to act) critically, independently, and tolerantly. 29
The task for schools, therefore, is to instill within children a belief that
society promotes and appreciates diverse views, independent inquiry,
critical thought, and public debate. To inculcate children with the belief
that individuals who resist becoming indoctrinated with all of the mores of
a society are valuable to that society is not an easy task. To do so, public
schools not only must intone the rhetoric of free speech, they must act and
structure themselves to give credibility to their statements. 3 ' Children
are unlikely to internalize the values of civic virtue if their schools appear
to systematically trivialize or ignore such values. Consequently, the public
recognition of First Amendment rights for students serves a necessary
pedagogical function.'
But in schools, as in other institutions, the claims of order compete
with the claims of freedom. Certainly education requires some degree of
discipline within the institution."3 But a student who is taught in an
environment where opposing views are suppressed to emphasize discipline
and order gets improper signals regarding democratic values and personal
self-awareness.
Consequently, to fulfill their inculcative functions, schools must offer
the experience of expressive liberties. It is through the experience of
making particular independent decisions that children develop the capacity
for making them generally.'33 "Being mature takes practice," reminds
11 For an earlier, more extensive discussion of the character-building implications of free
speech experiences, see supra note 88.
130 Schools that extol the virtues of free speech but then restrict expression institutionally are
actually teaching children powerful lessons about what rights really mean: -Watch what I do. not
what I say."
'3' See John H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 344-47
(1979) (justifying free speech for children in terms of its educational function).
'1 See Eva-Lotta Jansson, Disciplinean Issue at Center but Some Say District Troubles are
Typical Rather than a Substantial Concern, KAN. CITY STAR, June 22, 1995, at 1 (discussing
problems of student discipline and behavior in one school district); Shannon D. Murray,
Hammond Teachers Plan Uniform Approach to Discipline at Overcrowded School, BALTIMORE
SUN, July 30, 1995, at 10C (noting one school's response to increased disobedience ranged from
verbal reprimand to detention for using vulgar language and insulting other students).
Unquestioningly, order has deteriorated so severely in some schools that a significant emphasis
on discipline is warranted in these settings. Even in such environments, however, students will
be better prepared to be contributing members of society if their schools also convey the
importance of liberty, and indicate that there exist appropriate times and means responsibly to
question authority.
I Hafen. Developing Student Expression, supra note 95, at 696. The issue, thus, is focused
more on character development than autonomy. Cf. Rogers M. Smith, The "American Creed"and
American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States, 41 W. POL. Q. 225,
247 (1988) ("Freedom should not be understood to mean simply a lack of hindrance in doing
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Franklin Zimring. 134 "To know this is to suppose [one] justification for
extending privileges in public law ... to those who have not yet reached
full maturity.""35 It is also through experience, rather than rhetoric, that
students see and come to understand the way authority responds to
nonconformity in our society. Thus, schools must be aware of the vital
lessons they teach concerning the interplay of power, status, independence,
and inquisitiveness.
Education for citizenship is a complicated task. It requires children
to be socialized into the norms of society while remaining free to question
or even abandon them.'36 It demands that while teaching children what
they need to know (i.e., education of citizens), a process that necessitates
a degree of order and obedience to authority, they also must be taught the
value of, and skills needed for, questioning authority. Both liberty and
authority are essential to the inculcation of virtue. Consequently, the
question we must answer is: how should schools be structured to convey
our commitment to, and the importance of, both of these seemingly
conflicting values?
IV. SOME PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The mission of public education-consisting of both the education of
citizens and the education for citizenship-is formidable. Elsewhere I have
depicted this effort as an "ideological enigma": "
Schools are asked simultaneously to respect and nurture both the
communal and individual aspects of the human spirit. Schools invariably
shape children's attitudes through selectively exposing them to ideas and
perspectives, thereby predisposing them to accept certain established
views as adults. Yet, while indoctrinating the child, schools also
ostensibly exist to equip each child with the skills and self-confidence
necessary to allow him to reflect critically upon the values with which he
is being socialized. The school system, consequently, epitomizes the
tension between the focus of liberal political theory on individual
autonomy and the community's need to sustain and perpetuate itself.'38
Because of this "tension," public schools historically have been the stage
what we will. It means valuing and exercising our capacities for reflective self-direction and
choosing ways of life that preserve and enhance those capacities for all.").
1'3 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89 (1982).
135 Id.
'3 HARE. supra note 125, at 85.
" Ingber, Socialization, supra note 31. at 94.
I38 Id. at 94-95.
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of passionate struggles and conflicts. 3 9 Interestingly, this conflict most
often has not been over the lofty and potentially conflicting goals of
education."4  Rather, it has concerned the question of how these goals
are to be attained'-how schools should function and be structured, and
who should monitor their success. In turning to these practical problems,
let us first consider whether (and if so, how) we can create an educational
environment that supports order and obedience while encouraging critical
thought and the questioning of authority.
A. A Divided Educational Program
One would think the various components of the educational pro-
gram-the classroom, the library, extra-curricular activities and oth-
ers-would be structured to reinforce the efforts to fulfill common
educational goals. The problem is that we have identified goals which may
not, in all contexts, be consistent with each other. Developing virtue
requires both an obedience to authority and experiences of independent,
critical thought; the latter are sometimes at odds with authority. Perhaps
the answer is to artificially divide the educational program, dedicating part
to one perspective on the interplay between obedience and independence,
and the other to an alternative perspective. 42
1. Board of Education v. Pico: An Illustrative Case
This suggestion about artificially dividing the educational program,
although perhaps not revolutionary, seems the only way to understand cases
such as Board of Education v. Pico.43 In Pico, the Supreme Court
'3 See id. at 40-47 (discussing historical conflicts over selection of school texts for students).
'o For example, my writing has differed markedly with that of Professor Hafen over the need
for courts to recognize and uphold student free speech claims. Compare Hafen, Hazelwood, supra
note 5, at 685 (praising Hazelwood decision for reinforcing institutional authority of schools )
with Ingber, Rediscovering, supra note 98, at 83-84 (criticizing Hazelwood as giving school offi-
cials too much deference in controlling student speech). Yet, when Professor Hafen describes
"helping each individual to realize his own autonomous sense of self while simultaneously
inducting him into membership in the democratic community" as part of education's mission,
Hafen, Developing Student Expression, supra note 95, at 728, I can do nothing but concur.
'4' For example, Professor Hafen has expressed his concern that efforts to uphold individual-
ism were excessive and had taken their "toll on community and institutional continuity, especially
with respect to. . . institutions [such as schools]." Hafen, Developing Student Expression, supra
note 95, at 703.
"I Undoubtedly, no aspect of the educational program can be exclusively devoted to either
perspective. Degrees of both obedience and independence must exist in all contexts to avoid
imbuing either subservience orself-centeredness. However, differing contexts can emphasize one
perspective over another.
143 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
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found that the First Amendment restricts the power of school officials to
indoctrinate students. Specifically, the Court imposed constitutional limits
on a school board's discretion to remove books from junior and senior high
school libraries." The Court was highly fragmented; 45 nonetheless,
a clear majority held that a boundary exists beyond which school authorities
cannot venture to indoctrinate children with community values.'16
Writing for the plurality, 47 Justice Brennan found that the school
board in Pico had violated the student's "'right to receive information and
ideas.""'14  Brennan distilled this right from the "role of the First
Amendment . . . in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and
the dissemination of information and ideas." 49 This role, he concluded,
applied equally to public schools: "[J]ust as access to ideas makes it
possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and
press in a meaningful manner, such access prepares students for active and
effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which
1 Id. at 871-72.
"I The nine Justices filed seven separate opinions. Id. at 854-55.
'4 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 871-72 (plurality opinion) (determining that U.S. Constitution
limited school board's otherwise broad discretion to remove books from libraries), id. at 879-80
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (agreeing that First Amendment restricted school board's authority
to remove books from library); id. at 883 (White, J., concurring) (agreeing that U.S. Constitution
limited school board's removal of books).
4 The plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 854.
I44 Id. at 867 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). Arguably, the Court
had recognized a right to receive information in many different contexts. See Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (holding
that consumers have right to receive information through price advertisements by pharmacists):
Kleindienst v. Mandel. 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972) (recognizing right of university officials to
hear Marxist lecturer, but decided on other grounds): Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395
U.S. 367, 377-80 (1969) (stating that radio listeners have right to ideologically balanced
broadcasts); Stanley, 394 U.S. at 577 (addressing right to receive obscenity in home): Lamont
v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (discussing addressee's right to receive Communist
publication in mail); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (considering right to
receive handbills and pamphlets).
Despite these cases, the plurality opinion seemed to depart from prior court doctrine. Before
Pico, the Supreme Court had predicated the "right to know" upon the speaker's right to speak.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 757 ("If there is a right to advertise, there
is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising . . . ."). In other words, the right to know merely
protected the speaker's right to communicate with a willing listener. Authors, editors, and
publishers have no similar right requiring public schools to choose and distribute their books. A
"right to know" may prevent the government from unreasonably blocking the flow of
information. This right, however, certainly does not require the state affirmatively to aid speakers
in reaching potential recipients. See Garvey, supra note 131, at 374 (noting that right to know
does not place obligation on state to provide information to children).
'41 Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
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they will soon be adult members."' 50  Thus, Brennan found that a
student's right to receive ideas was inherent in the justifications used to
support the free speech guarantee generally.
The problem with this approach is that it neglects the very purpose of
public schools. A right to receive ideas is essentially inconsistent with the
inculcative function of public school education,' 5 ' a function which even
Justice Brennan acknowledged as legitimate.' 52 "Selectivity" is essential
to any school system. The plurality's view of education, taken to its
logical conclusion, would prohibit school boards from making even
curricular decisions-decisions which inherently compel choices of
inclusion and exclusion.
Justice Brennan was not oblivious to the conceptual difficulties that a
"right-to-know" in public schools created. He revealed his discomfort by
seeking to impose certain limits on this newly articulated right, including
a distinction between the classroom and the school library. '5 He stated
that value inculcation might justify a school board's absolute control over
the curriculum, but that such control was inappropriate in the school
library's atmosphere of unrestricted inquiry. '5
Distinguishing between the classroom and the library has some surface
appeal. 55 The classroom is prescriptive by nature, as evidenced by its
requirements of compulsory attendance and uniform curriculum.
Curriculum choices necessarily hinge upon the limited time and resources
available to the school system, and the need for students to use the same
textbook in a given course. The library, however, is different. Schools do
not compel students to use it. Its stacks may contain works beyond the
standard curriculum, where students can pursue individualized interests.
Consequently, the voluntary library seems more consistent with the
0 457 U.S. at 868.
"I, See Yudof, Librat Book Selection, supra note 23 (asserting that schooling enterprise
requires board's ability to choose textbooks and courses). The dissenting Justices in Pico-Burger.
Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor-emphasized this apparent conflict between the plurality's First
Amendment perspective and the long accepted goal of public education to train values. See, e.g.,
Pico, 457 U.S. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stressing that in order to inculcate students with
necessary values, school board must have discretion to decide appropriateness of materials for
school), id. at 914 (Rehnquist. J., dissenting) (noting that concept of students' rights of access
to information in schools is contrary to nature of education as inculcative).
1' See Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 ("We have. . . acknowledged that public schools are vitally
important . . . as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values' . . . ." (quoting Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
Pico, 457 U.S. at 869.
'4 Id.
"1' See Yudof, Library Book Selection. supra note 23 (noting -different attributes" of
classrooms and libraries).
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hub-bub of the marketplace than does the compulsory classroom. 5 6
Unlike the classroom, the library poses no risk of exposing students to
viewpoints they find disturbing or undesirable. A library book will be read
only by those who seek it out. 57
Despite these favorable points, Brennan's distinction between the
classroom and the library remains unconvincing. Viewing a school library
as a place of bounded student inquiry under the school authorities' direction
is no more unreasonable than viewing it as a place of broad, self-directed
student exploration. If the public school system in its entirety may
inculcate ideas, surely school libraries may contribute to that process.'58
The plurality severs the library from the goals of the educational venture
generally. Although some may prefer its approach, the plurality fails to
justify it as a constitutional requirement.
Thus, it simply is not illogical to choose to integrate the library into
the public school system's process of value inculcation. Our normal
predilections are to treat logically indistinguishable cases consistently.
Consistency loses its appeal, however, when it produces less beneficial,
rather than more beneficial, outcomes.'59 In such situations, inconsis-
tency can have an affirmative value."6
56 Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1976) (noting
that library rather than classroom is "mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas") (citing
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting)).
' Society, therefore, need not protect children from the library in the same way that it might
need to protect the child from unsolicited vulgarity over the radio. See FCC v. Pacifica Found..
438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (noting that children may be exposed to vulgarity over radio against
their wishes and without warning).
W Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 878 (1982) (Blackmun. J. concurring). The
plurality appears to have equated the public school library, which may reasonably be perceived
as an adjunct to the educational system, with the entrepreneur bookseller, who has no similar
responsibility.
9 See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance. in ESSAYS 45, 57 (1904) ('A foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and
divines.").
'" Logic, simply, may not be the only constitutionally valid criterion for making distinctions.
Lee Bollinger, for example, in his article on regulating mass media, argues that although, for
First Amendment purposes, electronic broadcasting and the print media are indistinguishable, a
'powerful rationality" exists for treating the two mediums differently-regulating the electronic
media more restrictively than is constitutionally permitted for its print media analogue. Lee C.
Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation
of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1976). He concludes:
What the Court has never fully appreciated is that the very similarity of the two major
branches of the mass media provides a rationale for treating them differently. By
permitting different treatment of the two institutions, the Court can facilitate realization
of the benefits of two distinct constitutional values, both of which ought to be fostered:
access in a highly concentrated press and minimal governmental intervention. Neither
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The public school system, as represented by Pico, was such a case. As
character-building institutions aimed at fostering a virtuous, democratic
polity, schools must inculcate both the importance of authority and the
value of liberty. By accepting an otherwise illogical distinction between
the classroom and the library-thus treating potentially like things
differently-the Court resolved the dilemma of promoting contending
norms simultaneously by "dividing" the school program into two
theoretical units, with one serving a broad indoctrinative function and the
other exhorting a student's right to receive a broad spectrum of informa-
tion. 6' Both liberty and authority received public affirmation.
2. Other Points of Division
Although Pico divides the education program between the curriculum
and the library, others have suggested alternative points. 62 In fact, the
side of the access controversy emerges victorious. The Court has imposed a
compromise-a compromise, however, not based on notions of expediency, but rather
on a reasoned, and principled, accommodation of competing first amendment values.
Id. at 36. By treating like things differently, the Court, at least partially, achieves two inconsistent
goals that otherwise could not be realized simultaneously.
161 The library is an ideal place to fulfill this latter role, thereby allowing schools to avoid
the appearance of imposing official orthodoxy upon our youth. First, overt ideological screening
of library books will more likely appear as the "book burning" that we equate with repressive
governments. Libraries and book stores play a crucial role in our culture and are closely
intertwined with the history and tradition behind freedom of speech and the press. Although one
may distinguish the function of a grade school library from that of a bookstore or a general
library open to the public-at-large, see supra note 156 and accompanying text, the distinction is
subtle, and not necessarily easily conveyed. On the other hand, society more fully equates the
classroom with the training of youth and the inculcation as performed by the family. See, e.g.,
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995) ("[T]eachers and administrators of
.. schools stand in loco parentis over children entrusted to them."). Official control of library
materials, therefore, strikes closer to the core of First Amendment rhetoric and threatens the
perception of individual choice and liberty.
'1 One education-law scholar, Stephen Goldstein, argues that what we are confronting is two
differing conceptual models of education-one prescriptive and the other analytic. Stephen
Goldstein, Reflections of Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
612, 614 (1970). While recognizing that these polar models signify only "theoretical paradigm[s]
that never exist in pure form," he then divides education not spatially (as in Pico) but rather,
chronologically. Id. He views pre-college public education as essentially prescriptive, involving
a passive student absorbing furnished information and accepted truths, and college and
post-graduate studies as analytic, where student and teacher engage each other as active
participants in the search for truth. Id. By dividing the educational process into two totally distinct
phases, Goldstein attempts to find a compromise between authoritative inculcation and the devel-
opment of the ability to think critically.
Yetafter analysis, Goldstein's effort at a chronological division must be rejected. Smothering
grade school children in orthodox values may preclude independence in college, since truly
successful inculcation inevitably colors future working and thinking habits. More troubling,
however, is that those students who never attend college will totally miss an education that
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interplay of Tinker and Hazelwood creates a new partition between the
domain of authority and that of independent choice. As described by
Professor Hafen, "Hazelwood now draws a ... distinction between a
student's private speech, which remains eligible for protection under
Tinker, and her expression through official school channels, which Tinker
no longer protects." 63 A case once viewed as an effort to structure an
environment which would serve as a "forum crucial in the training of
future leaders"" has been relegated to a position of protecting "private
student interpersonal communication in such places as school yards and
cafeterias."' 65  Furthermore, both Hazelwood and Tinker itself limit the
protection of student speech to conversation topics not directly challenging
school policies or confronting school authorities." 6  The domain of
critical, independent thought-an intellectual trait essential to a virtuous
democratic personality-has become limited indeed. If, during the
adolescence of the baby-boomer generation (the 1960s), we leaned strongly
toward rebellion, growth and change, then during the middle-age of that
same generation (the 1980s and 90s), the overwhelming emphasis is respect
for authority and deference to the judgment of "professional experts."
Both distinctions-that of private versus institutionally-sponsored
speech and that of institutionally-oriented versus institutionally-unrelated
speech-are most unfortunate if our educational mission includes, as I
believe it should, an effort to publicly support, promote experiences of, and
inculcate First Amendment norms. Once we acknowledge the necessity of
inculcating the free speech virtues of participation and tolerance as part of
education's central mission of character development, there is something
insidious about relegating free speech experiences to contexts unsponsored
by the educational institution. One would think inculcation would demand
a public showing of institutional commitment to free speech values. To
deny such values in all school sanctioned activities-the classroom, the
promotes free inquiry. Thus, we cannot so easily discount the primary and secondary school
student's role in educational decisions.
For another more flexible effort to account for a child's increasing readiness for exposure
to liberty experiences as she grows older, see Hafen, Developing Student Expression, supra note
95, at 696.
' Hafen, Hazelwood. supra note 5, at 689.
6 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
'6 Hafen, Developing Student Expression, supra note 95, at 728.
The Court in Tinkerstressed that the students' actions -neither interrupted school activities
nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others." Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
Hazelwood continued to emphasize the need for deference to school official determinations which
are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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school newspaper, school produced plays, etc.-demonstrates vividly the
insincerity of any rhetorical claims of the importance of free speech to the
molding of a democratic personality. The grudging acceptance of
independent, critical thought in contexts viewed as irrelevant to the
educational mission thereby explicitly excludes from that mission the
virtues embodied in the First Amendment. 67
Even more troubling is the inference that Tinker's impact should be
limited to its facts. Unlike Bethel and Hazelwood, the student communica-
tion prohibited in Tinker was unrelated to any school concern; it merely
happened to take place on school grounds. To confine Tinker's significance
to institutionally-unrelated speech, however, would be both ironic and
counterproductive. Such a limitation opens the school to discussions of
only those issues unconnected to the educational environment.'68 Reason
would support an opposite policy. 69 One would think the classroom (as
involved in Tinker) would serve least well as a forum for discussing matters
extraneous to the course. 70
More importantly for purposes of the character-enhancing role of free
speech experiences, the distinction between institutionally-oriented and
institutionally-unrelated expression is not merely unjustified, it is also
dysfunctional.' 7 ' To teach students that they are free to speak only as
167 Thus. I strongly disagree with Professor Hafen's attempt to develop a continuum of school
activities as a method for analyzing free speech claims, with the classroom curriculum at one
extreme and private intercommunication at the other. Hafen, Developing Student Expression,
supra note 95, at 728. For Hafen, the stronger the educational content of the activity, the more
it falls on the curricular side of the continuum and the less open it is to free speech claims. Id.
But Hafen is ignoring the inculcative, character-building function of education. (Or. at the very
least, he is describing the myopic view of the Hazelwood Court.) It is precisely in these
"educational" contexts that the child learns what the public school and, assumedly, society itself
value and what they do not. This is the vital lesson that most concerns me.
,1 Examples of speech left unprotected would include a student's rejection in a history class
of the portrayal of Thomas Jefferson-an owner of slaves-as a defender of freedom, criticism
of an officially prescribed dress code, or the protestation of a decision to discontinue music
training as a cost-saving measure.
169 Cf. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-43 (1966) (holding that protest held in
municipal library was constitutionally protected precisely because library itself was focus of
expressive activity).
173 As Justice Stevens aptly noted: "Any student of history who has been reprimanded for
talking about the World Series during a class discussion of the First Amendment knows that it
is incorrect to state that a 'time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either the
content or subject matter of speech.'" Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447
U.S. 530, 544-45 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting majority's opinion at 536).
Elsewhere, I have argued similarly against the Court's effort in Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983), to categorize speech according to differing degrees of protection afforded when
evaluating the free speech rights of public employees. Ingber, Rediscovering, supra note 98, at
58. The Court's requirement in Connick that protected statements must involve "matters of
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long as their message is tangential to their institutional environment is to
give a lesson in subservience rather than in participation and civic
courage.7 2  To tell school officials that, as speech regulators, they need
permit only student comments that are consistent with, or at least
unthreatening to, their "expert" perception of proper pedagogy or
educational suitability is to convey nothing to officials (or students) about
the importance of tolerance. Instead, such an approach cultivates a respect
for elitism and hierarchy. Any effort to instill the intellectual and
interpersonal habits of civic virtue must focus considerable attention on the
structuring of our educational institutions. The character-building lessons
learned through the experience of communicating with others, and
responding to the communication of others, are not dependent upon the
subject matter of the expression.13
public concern." 461 U.S. at 147. would make sense if the First Amendment were concerned
only with the interpersonal or systemic interests of free speech as a means of developing an
informed citizenry. But the requirement is flawed when one also considers the communal
component of free speech. The character-enhancing lessons of free speech learned through the
experience of communicating and regulating communication of others are not dependent on the
subject matter of the communication. In Connick, where the plaintiff was dismissed for
complaining about intra-office policies, 461 U.S. at 141, the employee learned that questioning
authority and attempting to retain some measure of control over a vital part of one's life (i.e.
one's work environment) is a risky enterprise. Ingber, Rediscovering, supra note 98, at 58. Her
supervisor, in turn, learned that those in positions of power can suppress challenges to authority.
Id. Clearly, the employee is not encouraged to embrace the value of self-governing participation.
nor is her supervisor encouraged to embrace that of tolerance.
Finally, there is something discomforting about government agency supervisors, or even
courts, determining whether or not a particular matter is one of public concern. "Whenever a
governmental institution decides that a given fact . . . is not a fitting topic for public discussion
nor relevant to any issue of public concern, it is essentially imposing an ideological perspective
.... .Stanley Ingber. Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy. 66 CAL. L. REV.
772, 845 (1985) [hereinafter Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries]: cf. Walter Weyrauch, Law
as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 73 CAL. L. REV. 699,709 (1978) (discussing judge's role
in deciding what is relevant in trial as reflecting "prevailing value judgments" of society of which
judge is part).
'12 Such was the fear that Justice Brennan expressed in his Hazelwood dissent. Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 284 (1988) (Brennan. J., dissenting).
11 Perhaps this realization led Professor Meiklejohn to abandon his distinction between public
and private speech. Initially, he insisted that only public speech deserved First Amendment
protection. See MEtKLEJOHN, supra note 84, at 24-25. Subsequently, however, he found the
distinction difficult to maintain. He finally was compelled to conclude that "novels and dramas
and paintings and poems" also fell within the ambit of free speech protection. Alexander Meikle-
john, The First Amendment is an Absolute. 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 257. Essentially. Meikle-
john had come to understand that the First Amendment protected not only the development of
political values but also anything that goes into the making of a good political actor. The Court.
occasionally, also has suggested this insight. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.. 431 U.S.
209, 231 (1977) (suggesting that expression concerning philosophical, social, artistic, economic,
literary, and ethical matters is entitled to full First Amendment protection).
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B. Rethinking Divisions and the Role of the Judiciary
1. The Meaning of Efficiency
The Court in Bethel unquestionably is correct when it states that "[t]he
process of educating our youth for citizenship in public school is not
confined to books, the curriculum, and the civic class." 74 It is equally
true that all components of the educational program-curriculum, library
and extra-curricular activities, such as student publications, election
assemblies and performing arts programs-may be structured and called
upon to contribute to the efficient fulfillment of the educational mission.
The problem is defining that mission. Efficiency is a concept that takes on
meaning only in relation to substantive goals. 75
Given our constitutional mandate, our educational goals should not be
limited to imparting to children useful information and transmitting to them
the cultural norms of the past. Our educational institutions also must
accept their responsibility for promoting democratic virtues in order to
further the communal goal of building the character necessary for a
democratic polity. Authority and obedience may aid the efficient pursuit
of some of our goals, but if free speech is neglected in the day-to-day
contexts so central to the character-forging experiences of our impression-
able youth, we risk breeding caution and stifling initiative, thereby
fostering only the virtue of obedience. 76 Thus, along with their ability
to achieve our prescriptive goals for education, schools must be structured
to offer experiences in which authority can be challenged and norms
questioned if they are to further the virtues of participation and tolerance,
and help to fulfill our polity-developing goals. Somewhere within the
official structure of our schools, we must promote the experience of free
speech values, and nowhere may we obviously and formally denigrate
them. '7
'1 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
17 See Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980).
176 Outside of educational contexts, courts have evaluated the impact on free speech goals of
regulations intended efficiently to aid the state's effort at maintaining litter-free streets and freely
circulating traffic. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y forKrishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 654 (1981) (holding that only if "alternative forums for the expression of... protected
speech exist" may state regulate distribution and sale of literature at state fair to further efficient
crowd flow); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (rejecting ban on leafletting intended
to prevent littering).
t77 The importance of public schools in the development of a democratic polity explains why
the rejection of student free speech claims cannot be justified simply as time, place and manner
restrictions. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (developing time, place and
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2. A Question of Trust and Symbolism
a. Deference to Expertise
Some scholars agree that schools should provide experiences
promoting student initiative and criticism of authority, yet still insist that
courts should reject student free speech claims.' Essentially, these
critics believe that, although such opportunities may be good pedagogy,
their existence, timing, and frequency are matters of educational philosophy
left to educational officials and professionals. Consequently, these
opportunities should not be compelled by courts as constitutional man-
dates.'79 This position of judicial deference, often accepted by jurists,
represents a deep-seated discomfort with the competence of courts to
second-guess decisions of alleged school experts'"O Because the courts
lack special knowledge of proper pedagogy for our schools, they should
avoid reviewing policies made by those who claim expertise and are
immersed in the educational settings. 8'
Claims of expertise, however, should not be a talisman that magically
insulates a group's judgment from review." On the contrary, the very
immersion of educational specialists into the mire of conflicts they are to
resolve should call into question the advisability of deference. Individuals
accustomed to wielding power cannot readily see issues from the perspec-
manner doctrine). A student who claims a right of access to a particular book, for example. may
be reminded that despite the book's absence from the school library, it remains available at the
public libraries and local bookstores. A student prohibited from denouncing a school dress code
during a school assembly may well be able to state the same complaint in a public park across
the street from the school yard. Obviously, if First Amendment claims are to be recognized, the
rationale cannot be truly a right of access to information or to communicate one's thoughts.
Rather, the concern must be for the values that schools ought to be inculcating and the character
traits they ought to be forging. For those purposes, access or opportunity away from the school
is irrelevant. But see Hafen, Developing Student Expression. supra note 95, at 724 (noting that
under Supreme Court doctrine child wishing to express herself in ways prohibited at school
continues to have "entire off-campus world" at her disposal). For further discussion of this point.
see infra text accompanying notes 184-88.
I7s See, e.g., Hafen, Schools, supra note 16. at 615.
179 Id.
"8 See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (asserting that educational
specialists, rather than courts, should make decisions requiring academic judgment).
"' Hafen, Developing Student Expression, supra note 95, at 699 (stating that schools must
be protected from "second-guessing by the courts when educational issues are at stake").
832 Burton Bledstein has studied the dangers of professionalism and the claims of expertise
generally. He concludes by cautioning his readers to beware of the "arrogance, shallowness, and
potential abuses . . . by . . . individuals who justify their special treatment and betray society's
trust by invoking professional privilege, confidence and secrecy." BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE
CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM 334 (1976).
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tive of those who are the subjects of their authority. Judges, of course, are
not immune from this disability,"s nor are they necessarily wiser or more
beneficent than other bureaucrats. But at least the controversies they are
asked to resolve do not involve individuals questioning judicial authority
and then asking tolerance of the court."s The immersion of educators in
the institutional setting of public schools likely makes their authority in
such settings a fundamental source of self-image. Relying on them to
tolerate the questioning of their judgment by students (i.e. underlings) may
be a highly unrealistic expectation.' Because judges are detached from
the controversy, they have less at stake and may be more willing to
consider the character-building significance embedded in the First
Amendment's provisions. Given the risk of petty tyrants, some measure
of judicial oversight of public school decision-makers is essential to
motivate them to consider the communal worth of recognizing constitution-
al claims. Consequently, continued judicial deference to school official
discretion denigrates First Amendment values. If our voiced commitment
to develop the intellectual attributes of a democratic polity is not to ring
hollow, a meaningful and visible degree of judicial review of public school
decisions is imperative.
b. Confirming Free Speech Rhetoric: An Illustration
Such a demonstration of public commitment, however, does not
require the courts to be in the business of micro-managing our schools by
reviewing each and every educational decision.'86 It is sufficient that
courts review school officials' decisions and acknowledge students' speech
IS' As Thomas Grey has noted, judges are simply -officials given more job security than
other civil servants. They are comfortably middle-of-the-road. senatorially confirmable
lawyer-politicians. .... [U]nder the robes, federal judges are ordinary members of the
comfortable classes." Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1,
23-24 (1984).
"e Courts have been unsympathetic to parties who claim the right to question judicial
authority through disobedience, although similar questioning of legislative authority has been
upheld. Compare Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (asserting that one should be able to act on his belief in unconstitutionality of prior
restraint on speech and ignore restraint, rather than being compelled to seek review by court) with
Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317-19 (1967) (holding that, despite questionable
constitutional validity of injunction against street parades, affected individuals were obligated to
apply to courts for dissolution of injunction rather than simply to disobey it).
11 Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276,
1334 (1984) (insisting that bureaucratic self-policing is not credible).
11 Justice Black. in his concurrence in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). essentially
made this point. Id. at 114 (Black, J., concurring) (insisting that courts lack wherewithal to
supervise "every public school in every hamlet and city in the United States").
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rights with sufficient frequency to retain the credibility of our claimed
commitment to First Amendment values. Courts also must react to those
occasional "outrageous" cases where the conflict between our free speech
rhetoric and public school reality is simply too blatant.'1
7
Again, Pico may help to illustrate this point.'88 Justice Brennan, in
articulating a students' "right to know," carefully limited the restriction on
school board discretion to situations where the board removed library
books, rather than simply never acquiring them in the first place.' 89
Given that limited resources obviously prohibit schools from acquiring
every book published, this distinction between the acquisition and removal
of books appears sensible.
Upon closer analysis, however, the distinction seems totally inconsis-
tent with any notion of a student's right to know. The student suffers the
same loss of perspectives regarding exposure to new ideas whether the
school removes the books or initially rejects them. '9 Either way,
selective exposure may shape children's attitudes. The "right-to-know"
surely does not depend on whether school officials read a book and
officially reject its perspectives after, rather than before, its purchase.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Pico, however, clarifies the
significance of this distinction. Blackmun saw the constitutional issue
differently from the plurality. According to the Justice, the state could
emphasize certain values or subjects, and even inculcate community
perspectives, as long as it did not "attempt to shield students from certain
ideas that officials find politically distasteful." ''9 The issue was not
whether students had access, but whether the board's act symbolically
stigmatized the rejected book, author or perspective. Under his approach,
schools, consistent with their function of inculcating values, could support
one point of view while critically evaluating and rejecting an alternative.
Only by condemning an idea-by officially labeling it as beyond the pale
I"' Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976), illustrates an overt conflict with
constitutional symbols that required court intervention. In Wilson. a high school teacher who had
invited a series of outside speakers to address his political science class challenged a school board
order prohibiting political guest speakers. Id. at 1361. The board issued its order after speeches
by a Democrat, a Republican, and a member of the John Birch Society, but before a scheduled
speech by a Communist. Id. The content and timing of the order made it obvious that the board's
purpose was to prevent student access to, and to stigmatize, a specific political perspective. Id.
at 1364. The Oregon district court held the order unconstitutional. stating that it unreasonably
infringed on the student's right to know. Id.
18 See supra text accompanying notes 143-54.
"s Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 862 (1982).
190 See Diamond, supra note 108, at 516: Garvey, supra note 131, at 372.
191 Pico, 457 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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of free discussion and scrutiny-would schools violate the Constitution.
Justice Blackmun thus identified the symbolic importance of the
Court's distinction. The issue did not involve access to expression, or even
whether the government may actually control and indoctrinate. Instead, the
issue was whether there existed the appearance of governmental manipula-
tion and repudiation of First Amendment values."9 Refusal to purchase
a book merely makes that book one of innumerable others that the school
has not acquired.'93 Removal, on the other hand, singles out a book for
disapproval. This kind of purge is more inimical to the First Amendment
because it dramatically communicates official disapproval of the condemned
work in a way that failing to acquire a book normally does not. Again,
since both failure to acquire and removal prevent a student from reading
a particular work in the school library, the issue is clearly one of symbols
rather than access.194
Thus, the Court intervened in Pico because the school board's effort
to manipulate students to conform to board members' political and social
tastes was simply too flagrant-too reminiscent of the "book burning" we
192 With exemplary candor, Justice Blackmun noted the importance of appearances.
confessing:
I also have some doubt that there is a theoretical distinction between removal of
a book and failure to acquire a book. But as Judge Newman [of the Second Circuit]
observed [in his concurrence to the lower Second Circuit decision], there is a profound
practical and evidentiary distinction between the two actions: "removal, more than
failure to acquire, is likely to suggest that an impermissible political motivation may
be present. There are many reasons why a book is not acquired, the most obvious
being limited resources, but there are few legitimate reasons why a book, once
acquired, should be removed from a library not filled to capacity."
Id. at 878 n.l (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 436
(2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)).
193 Thus, to make a constitutional case, a teacher or student would have the difficult-if not
impossible-task of proving that the school was not purchasing a book because the librarian or
school board found its content objectionable.
11 Judge Newman, of the Second Circuit, clearly addressed in his Pico opinion the central
importance of symbolism in the school board's actions:
The symbolic effect of a school's action in removing a book solely because of its ideas
will often be more significant than the resulting limitation upon access to it. The fact
that the book barred from the school library may be available elsewhere is not decisive.
What is significant is that the school has used its public power to perform an act clearly
indicating that the views represented by the forbidden book are unacceptable. The
impact of burning a book does not depend on whether every copy is on the fire.
Removing a book from a school library is a less offensive act, but it can also pose a
substantial threat of suppression.
Pico, 638 F.2d at 434 (Newman, J., concurring).
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equate with repressive governments. 95 The Court was obliged to uphold
constitutional symbols and aid the process of inculcating First Amendment
values. The risks of excessive judicial involvement in public schools were,
however, also obvious to the Court. Much of Pico, therefore, may be
explained as an effort to uphold constitutional appearances while limiting
judicial intrusion to only those cases in which appearances are most in jeopardy.
c. Motivating Tolerance and Constitutional Sensitivity
As I stated earlier, when courts refrain from questioning any decision
labeled "pedagogical" by school officials, they have acceded to the
judgment of educational professionals and their claims of expertise.96
Relying on such individuals to exhibit the virtue of tolerance and to
promote that of questioning authority is unrealistic when it is their very
authority that is being contested.' 97  Consequently, self-policing is no
more credible when practiced by school authorities than when practiced by
anyone else in society. Yet judicial deference must assume that just this
form of self-regulation will take place.
Occasional judicial intervention when First Amendment values appear
most in jeopardy offers students a degree of proof of the importance their
community attaches to the democratic virtues of participation, critical
thought, and tolerance. The potential of judicial oversight, however, does
more than confirm the importance of free speech norms to students as they
are inducted into our democratic polity. It also motivates school officials
to consider and to exhibit the democratic virtue of tolerance. If school
officials know that courts will involve themselves, at least in extreme cases,
they may have sufficient reason to regard seriously their responsibility for
both nurturing and exhibiting the civic virtues of a democratic polity and
refrain from acting precipitantly. 98
Furthermore, the very possibility of judicial oversight has a disciplin-
ary effect on the sorts of measures or regulations that school officials can
19' See supra note 161 (discussing reasons libraries, compared to classrooms, are well suited
to symbolize schools' recognition of free speech values).
'6 See supra text accompanying notes 178-85 and note 182 (discussing dangers of deferring
to claims of expertise).
" See supra text accompanying note 185 (noting that it is unlikely that educators will tolerate
students' questioning of their judgment).
198 See Yudof, Library Book Selections, supra note 23, at 553; see also James v. Board of
Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972). The Second Circuit
stressed its belief that the very threat of judicial involvement would temper school board abuse.
Id. For some, this possibility was the most significant contribution of Pico. See Comment, Board
of Education v. Pico: The Supreme Court's Answer to School Library Censorship. 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1103, 1124 (1983).
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propose or enforce because of the potential need to present publicly the
rationale for these actions. 199  When positions must be defended by
argument and reason, they are not likely to be justified in terms of
self-interest. The requirement of appeal to public-oriented reasons may
increase the probability that public-oriented actions will be taken in the
end.' The risk associated with the more visible process of decision-
making involved in a judicial critique of state proffered rationales heightens
the likelihood of such pressures. Thus, a convergence is possible-and
necessary-between the adjudicatory process, by which some limited
number of conflicts are resolved, and promoting civic virtues throughout
the corridors of government, including those of our public schools.2"'
The greatest influence of intermittent judicial intervention, therefore,
may be on the method and content of the deliberations of school boards and
officials. As such, the constitutional limits posed may serve an important
function even if these limits do appear poorly defined,2'2 mostly symbol-
" Several constitutional theorists posit a conception of constitutional review that features
precisely this process of public explanation and discussion. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1970) (depicting constitutional decisions
as part of national conversation): Eugene V. Rostow. The Democratic Character of Judicial
Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952) (referring to judicial discussion of problems as -a
vital element in the community experience through which American policy is made"): see also
Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice. 93 HARV. L. REV. 1. 14 (1979) ("The task of
a judge . . . should be seen as giving meaning to our public values and adjudication as the
process through which that meaning is revealed or elaborated.-).
I Tocqueville suggested as much. See JOHN STUART MILL. Tocqueville on Democracy in
America, in ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND CULTURE 187, 223-24 (1962): see also WILLIAM N.
NELSON, ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY 94-130 (1980) (emphasizing public deliberation as value
of democracy); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 35-42
(1983) (critically discussing this view). Of course, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the extent
of this effect. Self-interest motivations may merely be concealed; the requirement of deliberation
can invite hypocrisy. Even hypocrisy, however, may create feelings of guilt that, in turn, may
act as a constraining factor. Stanley Ingber, The Interface of Myth and Practice in Law, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 309, 353-56 (1981).
1' Thus, the aim of occasional judicial intervention is not increased litigation. The most
important character-building lessons are not those gained from isolated judicial decisions. Rather,
these lessons are learned from the way educational institutions handle conflict generally. Judicial
oversight serves its function best when it motivates all parties-teachers, administrators, parents,
and students-to seek methods of conflict resolution, other than courts, which promote the
development of those attributes conducive to a democratic polity. See infra note 202 (discussing
similar point): see also Ingber, Rediscovering. supra note 98, at 93-97 (considering judicial role
in encouraging decisional processes consistent with "structural due process").
02 The amorphous and incomplete nature of the rules which the courts have designed for the
public schools provides institutional flexibility but also imposes a high level of institutional
uncertainty and insecurity. These indeterminate precepts do supply the means, however, for
courts to confront those "outrageous" cases while avoiding the need to thrust themselves into all
of the multitudinous conflicts that may arise daily in our public schools. See supra text
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ic,2°3 and self-enforced.2 4  Cases such as Tinker and Pico, by interject-
ing a constitutional element into educational matters, may do more than
simply make school board members aware of the risk of litigation. 0
Hopefully, they also imbue board members and the community they
represent with a different sense of their educational role and responsibility,
a sense that recognizes the importance of inculcating an appreciation for
tolerance and independent, critical thought-as well as for authority-in a
process of educating for citizenship.
3. Imprecise Divisions
a. Messages of Exclusion
Earlier, I suggested the possible need to divide the educational
program, dedicating part to experiences fostering the virtues of order and
authority, and part to those instilling the virtues of liberty, including
independent, critical thought and tolerance. 206  Such a division, I
mentioned, hopefully would demonstrate the cultural importance given to
these virtues (thus facilitating the process of inculcation) while allowing
students to practice the differing skills required for virtuous citizenship.
accompanying note 183-85 (discussing court deference to educational experts).
I Thurmond Arnold, critiquing the role of symbolism in government, cogently exclaimed:
"Almost all human conduct is symbolic. Almost all institutional habits are symbolic. The symbols
are everywhere inconsistent. Society is generally more interested in standing on the side lines and
watching itself go by in a whole series of different uniforms than it is in practical objectives."
THURMOND ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 17 (1935).
Yudof, Libray Book Selection. supra note 23 (making same point).
2 Some concern for litigation may not be bad. School boards (and other school officials)
may avoid the cost and potential embarrassment of lawsuits if they encourage all parties of
interest to enter the deliberative process early, and listen to all positions with respect and
consideration. The heart of democratic government is a sense shared by all that their particular
interests, prejudices, and diverse characteristics are brought to bear on the decision-making
process. See ARNOLD, supra note 203, at 34 (recognizing that government must give diverse
groups at least symbolic recognition and respect for worth of differing precepts when writing.
-the function of law is not so much to guide society, as to comfort it"). Regardless of the
decision reached, all concerned will more likely accept the result if no affected group feels
alienated from the decision-making process. See, e.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp.
1138, 1152-53 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (suggesting that school boards should be prevented from
functioning unless they provide method to be heard for those affected by board decisions). School
boards, reading these decisions, should feel pressure to solicit, rather than ignore or deprecate.
the views of various affected groups. Such pressure and the behavior it promotes are consistent
with the virtues of a democratic polity-virtues that schools should inculcate by deed as well as
by word.
See supra text accompanying note 142. I also cautioned, at that point, against the possible
misconception that any part of the education program could be exclusively devoted to any one
pattern of experiences. See supra note 142.
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More recently, I attempted to limit judicial intrusion upon school affairs to
only that number of occasions needed to publicly reaffirm our society's
commitment to First Amendment values, especially where the conflict
between free speech rhetoric and public school reality is so glaring as to
threaten the credibility of our resolve.2°7
Fulfilling the purpose I have set for judicial oversight, however, likely
hinders our ability to maintain a clear division regarding which aspect of
the educational program will concentrate on which component of civic
virtue. Divisions cannot be precise because the messages conveyed can be
profoundly different as one varies the circumstances from which they
emerge.
For example, an analysis of court decisions would suggest that
although school boards must be cautious in removing books from a school
library, the latitude they have in determining what books to order initially
is considerable. 28 Yet the very justification that supports this distinction
between removing and obtaining a book compels it to remain obscure. The
issue at stake in these library cases, as revealed earlier,' was not
informational access for students. Rather, it was whether an idea had been
officially condemned as beyond the pale of free discussion and scrutiny.
This stigmatization-this badge of infamy-simply is more obvious when
books are removed than when they merely are not purchased. This
situation, however, might not always be the case.
Consider a situation where the school board publicly announces that
it is determined never to buy a work written by a homosexual or one that
portrays homosexuality in a positive light. Such action communicates, as
clearly as any book removal, that the views of homosexuals, or a favorable
perspective on homosexual life, are so unacceptable-so "beyond the
pale"-as to be unworthy of even the slightest consideration.' 0 It is this
m See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853. 863-72 (1982) (plurality opinion).
See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
210 Justice Rehnquist recognized the possibility of such a situation in his dissent in Pico,
rejecting the distinction between initial purchases and the removals of school library books. Pico,
457 U.S. at 916-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). If the issue was public visibility, he reasoned, "a
school board's public announcement of its refusal to acquire certain books would have every bit
as much impact on public attention as would an equally publicized decision to remove the books."
Id. Justice Rehnquist is clearly right. His only error is in his conclusion that once we recognize
that book removals and acquisitions cannot be theoretically distinguished, the only option for
courts is to refrain from oversight of public school library policies altogether. The alternative,
quite obviously, in those situations where the basis for nonacquisition is sufficiently well known
to make the purchase/removal distinction unconvincing, is to dismiss the distinction and condemn
both deeds.
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official message of exclusion, rather than any concern about access or the
ability to categorize the deed as one of removal rather than of nonacquisi-
tion, " that justifies judicial intervention in order to reinforce symbolical-
ly our conception of individual integrity2 2 and our commitment to
tolerance as a civic virtue.2 3
b. Curriculum and Classroom Activities
Analysis of the importance, for First Amendment purposes, of
messages of exclusion emanating from public schools is illuminating but
complicated. It brings into question some understandings about the
importance of order and authority in divisions of the educational process
where these values normally are assumed to reign supreme. Both jurists
and scholars have generally agreed that the judgment of school boards
concerning the curriculum2 4 (except where that judgment implicates
21 The distinction between removal and nonacquisition is essentially a surrogate means for
noting the presence of such a message of exclusion. In reality, given the need for routine
decisions as to which books the schools initially should purchase, no need normally exists to
publicize a decision not to purchase any given book. The decision to remove a book already
purchased, however, is likely to be sufficiently exceptional to require. if noticed, some public
explanation. See supra text accompanying notes 192-94 and note 192 (recognizing practical.
evidentiary significance of book removals compared to purchases).
2'2 Earlier, I noted that under the republican political theory an individual cannot be
understood outside of her communal interactive context. See supra text accompanying notes 65-
73. Because of their inculcative role, schools, perhaps more than other institutions, implicitly
accept this perspective. But for those persons committed to liberal individualism, see supra text
accompanying notes 56-61. a reference to the First Amendment as a limitation on indoctrination
by public schools serves to protect the appearance of promoting individual integrity. In this vein.
and given the present primacy of liberal political philosophy, see supra text accompanying note
92, elsewhere I have asserted:
Public acceptance of the myth of individual autonomy and the value neutral state
imparts an aura of legitimacy and authority to government. Although obvious
discrepancies exist between this myth and the reality of value inculcation, full public
awareness of these discrepancies could threaten the legitimacy of governmental decision
making. Preserving the myth thus is crucial to continued social stability. Preservation
requires that the public perceives no systematic manipulation of the individual's
perspective by processes of indoctrination or socialization.
Ingber, Socialization, supra note 31. at 71-72 (footnotes omitted). The values of the First
Amendment thus serve important functions both under individualism and under civic
republicanism. For one, they legitimate government: for the other, they promote character--
building and civic virtue.
213 Although official messages of exclusion always should be judicially suspect. I conclude
below that they are sometimes justified. See infra note 218. The questions to be asked are, of
course, what are the standards of justification. and who shall enforce them.
214 Decisions overtly as diverse as Tinker, Pico and Hazelwood appear to agree that curricular
judgments of school officials are virtually absolute (excluding those implicating separation of
church and state). See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260. 271 (1988)
INCULCATION OF WRTUE
separation of church and state)z"5 and the judgment of teachers concern-
ing the use and substance of classroom discussions216 are not subject to
judicial second-guessing. Student liberty claims seem least compelling
(and, thus, least likely to gain judicial support) when they are directed at
these issues or contexts.217  Yet understanding the proper judi-
cial/constitutional grounds for discomfort over messages of exclusion may
necessitate reconsideration of this general belief in an unbridled commit-
ment to authority when dealing with these issues. Upon reflection, the
very concept of academic freedom,21 8 which is at times judicially en-
forced, 219 represents a limitation upon the supremacy of order and
(determining that educators are entitled to exercise significant control over "activities [that] may
fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum"): Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853.
869 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("[School Board members] might well defend their claim of abso-
lute discretion in matters of curriculum . . .. "): see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (stressing fact that student petitioners had not
"interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs"). Many scholars concur.
See, e.g., Hafen, Developing Student Expression, supra note 95, at 728 (noting that student free
speech claims are least likely to obtain judicial approval when directed at classroom curriculum):
Diane Ravitch. The Continuing Crisis: Fashions in Education, 1984 AM. SCHOLAR 183, 193
(expressing doubt as to whether academic curriculum can be democratized "without cheapening
it").
211 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding unconstitutional state law
requiring teaching of "creation science" whenever theory of evolution is taught): Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down state law prohibiting public school teachers from
teaching evolution).
216 See, e.g., Hazehvood, 484 U.S. at 271 (recognizing authority of teachers to control
student expression to assure other students learn intended lesson); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514
(emphasizing that students' act of protest, although taking place within classroom, was not
directed at school or its personnel and, as silent demonstration, did not interrupt class), Hafen,
Developing Student Expression, supra note 95, at 728 (minimizing legal significance of student
free speech claims in classroom).
217 Needless-to-say, school boards or teachers, without judicial insistence, could decide for
their own institutional or pedagogical reasons to encourage participation of students, and other
school community members, in curricular deliberations and in the structuring of norms of
classroom discussion.
28 The initial concept of academic freedom grew out of a German university setting. It
included the "idea of 'convincing' one's students, of winning them over to the personal system
and philosophical views of the professor. . . ." Walter P. Metzger, The German Contribution
to the American Theor. ofAcademic Freedom, in 1 EMERSON, HABER AND DORSEN'S POLITICAL
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 806 (4th ed. 1976). American academic opinion has
not condoned fully this pedagogical approach. Id. For a comprehensive history of academic
freedom in this country, see RICHARD HoFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955).
219 Regarding the constitutional basis of academic freedom, the Supreme Court generally has
confined itself to a few "eloquent but isolated statements." THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 616 (1971). These statements always are made in reference to more
traditional constitutional doctrines. Thus, the Court has at various times derived academic
freedom from free speech, due process, the rule against vagueness in statutory language, and the
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authority even when dealing with curricular matters.
A school board, intent on conveying information and inculcating
norms valued by its members, rightfully would insist upon the authority to
determine what to exclude, as well as what to include, in the school's
curriculum.'22  Nevertheless, courts have distinguished curricular
inclusions from exclusions, acknowledging greater school board control
over minimum, rather than maximum, curriculum content. Teacher
discharge cases illustrate this pattern. The courts have permitted the school
board to discharge a teacher to assure that the board's own chosen material
was transmitted to the student, but have prohibited a discharge that was
grounded in an effort to assure that the material was transmitted to the
exclusion of competing perspectives.'2' Only in the latter situation has the
dismissal communicated an official rejection of specific information or
perspectives. Only then has the board sent a message of exclusion and
intolerance for the community, including students, to hear.
Consequently, the doctrine of academic freedom is best explained not
as a constitutional entitlement of the teacher per se, but as a mechanism for
restricting the school system's ability to impose uniform values upon a
captive and impressionable audience.' It prevents the school board
from communicating to the students, through the spectacle of a teacher's
discharge, the importance of subservience and the danger of independent,
rule against established religion. Id. at 610. For some relevant cases upholding academic freedom
claims, see infra notes 221-22.
1 "[E]ducation may be viewed as providing certain inputs to students with the decision of
what not to communicate being equally as significant as that of what to communicate." STEPHEN
R. GOLDSTEIN & E. GORDON GEE, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 108 (1974): see Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 914 (Rehnquist. J., dissenting) ("Determining what information not
to present to the students is often as important as identifying relevant material.").
11 See Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980) (protecting
teacher's right to include controversial material relevant to prescribed curriculum even when
forbidden to do so by superiors); see also Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom. 81
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1098 (1968) (theorizing that minimum, but not maximum standards, are
inherent in concept of compulsory education). Compare Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d
1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 1979) (permitting discharge of teacher who refused to teach "patriotic
ceremonies"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980) with Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1. 469
F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (protecting teacher's right to sit silently and not participate while another
teacher conducted class flag ceremonies), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
Most court decisions on academic freedom ground themselves in the belief that
independent thinking by teachers is needed to cultivate students' capacity for critical and
independent thought through exposure to a diversity of views. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194-98 (1952) (Frankfurter. J.,
concurring); Cary v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945, 949 (D. Colo. 1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d
535 (10th Cir. 1979); Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3, 10-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); see also
TUSSMAN, supra note 108, at 58-59.
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critical thought. Such a lesson would be inconsistent with the necessity to
educate for citizenship, and to enhance the character of a democratic polity.
The classroom component of this argument is somewhat more difficult
to document. Instead, let me address your educated instincts. In 1987, the
Supreme Court rejected, as being in violation of the Establishment Clause,
Louisiana's attempt to require instruction in "creation science" whenever
the theory of evolution was taught.' Does the prohibition of a school
system from teaching "scientific creationism" equally permit a teacher's
silencing of a student who, consistent with the normal pattern of student
discussion,22 wishes to state her concern over evolution's deviation from
the biblical account of the creation of humankind? There seems something
quite different between a public school's inability to promote a specific
religious belief,' and a public school teacher's authority to banish from
his classroom as unworthy of comment-as beyond the pale6-a
perspective held by people of good will within the community. The
difference may be one between preventing schools from fostering religious
beliefs within students and allowing teachers to officially denigrate those
same beliefs when expressed by children in their classes.7' Thus, even
the classroom must be structured to avoid the blatant besmirching of First
'I' Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987).
2 Thus, I am excluding from my question the student who decries the instructor or other
students, who screams, or who refuses to yield the floor after the accustomed limit on a single
student's speaking time has elapsed.
2 The Court in Aguillard found Louisiana's purpose in requiring the teaching of "creation
science" to be the advancement of a particular religious belief. 482 U.S. at 593.
This argument cannot be taken too far. Some perspectives really may be beyond the pale:
for example, one supporting the sexual abuse of children. In the process of defining ourselves as
a community, some values become so entrenched and widely accepted in our cultural community
that they are no longer subject to serious debate. At this point they become part of our "civil
religion," see Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion innAmerica, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967) (introducing
term "civil religion" into modem lexicon), and their antithesis comes to reside outside the
universe of culturally conceivable options. See Ingber, Rediscovering, supra note 98, at 1517-20
(trying to capture this concept through image of "community agenda of alternatives"). The value
of protecting children from sexual abuse has likely reached such a position in contemporary
America. Thus, silencing the classroom expression of a contrary perspective is unlikely to even
raise ajudicial eyebrow. The same cannot be said with respect to the status of the cultural debate
over the origin of humankind and the significance of the biblically-based perspective. Defining
the boundary of our "universe of culturally conceivable options" may sometimes appear
self-evident; at other times, it may constitute the most difficult decision that school officials and.
at times and in due course, courts, must make.
7 Silencing such beliefs is a violation of both the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (finding that concept of free speech was
violated in university's refusal to provide facilities to student group wishing to use them for
religious worship and discussion, while generally makingthose facilities available to other student
groups).
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Amendment values.
c. Extra-Curricular Activities
As shown, even the curricular and classroom components of public
education may be judicially compelled at times to communicate the virtues
of liberty.' Nevertheless, these components remain most dependent on
the alternative virtues of order and authority. A reasonable pedagogical
theory that educators might choose perceives the grade-school classroom
as prescriptive by nature, and identifies curriculum choices as hinging upon
the limited time and resources of the school system and the requirement
that students use the same textbooks in a given course. 9 Consequently,
when evaluating the degree of judicial oversight properly directed toward
extra-curricular activities, one finds that some activities are virtually part
of the classroom curriculum, demanding much the same emphasis on order
and authority. Others, however, can-and likely should-proceed quite
effectively without this emphasis and with a greater recognition of the
cultural significance of liberty." ° Under the latter set of circumstances,
if liberty is denied unnecessarily, it communicates to students the
undesirable message of institutional indifference or societal disregard for
liberty-oriented virtues. This message is most disquieting given our alleged
2' See supra text accompanying notes 214-27.
, See supra text following note 152; see also Yudof, Library Book Selection, supra note 23,
at 547 (stressing educational limitations of classroom). Other pedagogical perspectives reject these
perceptions. Beginning with John Dewey, some education theorists have stressed the
communitarian significance of the child's role in his own education. See JOHN DEWEY,
DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 393 (1916); see also Lawrence Kohlberg & Rochelle Mayer,
Development as the Aim of Education, 42 HARV. EDUC. REV. 449, 494 (1972) (agreeing with
Dewey's view and asserting "that all children ... are 'philosophers' intent on organizing their
lives into universal patterns of meaning"). For such theorists, education must be participatory.
Despite this conflict, one should recall Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905), noting that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbet Spencer's Social Statics." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). If Holmes is correct, there
would seem no greater justification for interpreting the Constitution to impose John Dewey's
educational viewpoint. See DEWEY. supra. Educators may choose the pedagogical theory they
prefer as long as they do not apply it in ways which communicate and inculcate denigration of
values of liberty. The communal interests of free speech cannot permit this.
"m This portion tracks the contextual standard for protecting speech employed in Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). In Grayned. the Court sustained an ordinance barring
certain demonstrations near schools after questioning "whether the manner of expression [was]
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Id. at
116. Under a "basic incompatibility" test, the nature or mission of the institution initially dictates
whether the regulation is appropriate. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992). If the communicative pattern is compatible with the institution's
continued effective functioning, then tolerance should be exercised andparticipation encouraged.
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attempt to inculcate democratic values as part of the community's
educational mission.
Thus, not all extra-curricular activities justify equal degrees of judicial
deference to the judgment of educational professionals. The Court's lack
of this understanding in Hazelwood is more troubling than its precise
holding. Because the school newspaper at issue was a graded classroom
assignment of a journalism course,"' it arguably was subject to the same
school and faculty oversight as any other classroom assignment. The
Court, however, did not limit itself to these facts. Instead, it gave
educators carte blanche control over the content of all "school-sponsored"
student speech whenever a pedagogical explanation was possible. The
phrase "school sponsored" appears to be defined so broadly as to include
any student communication relevant to, and delivered during, a school--
authorized activity. 2  This definition not only encompasses classroom
expression, but also student speech associated with all extra-curricular
activities. As previously suggested, this perception extends judicial
deference too far. 3 It allows schools, with the imprimatur of constitution-
ality, to be structured to enforce subservience to an unrelenting authority.
The lessons taught in such an environment are antithetical to those needed
to habituate civic virtue.
Contemplating a different type of extra-curricular activity helps
demonstrate the unfortunate consequences of the Court's ruling. Given the
Justices' apparent indifference to the precise facts of Hazelwood, one can
only assume the Court would reach the same conclusion in a case involving
a student newspaper that was not associated with any journalism course, but
was produced by students on school grounds as an on-going project of an
offically-recognized extra-curricular journalism club with a faculty advisor.
Under such circumstances, however, I would argue that the greater
detachment of the student paper from the school curriculum and, therefore,
its greater symbolic similarity to the press generally, make official
silencing' of the paper much more damaging to our goal of forging a
,31 For a review of the factual details of the Hazelwood conflict that occurs in Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), see supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
11 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-74. Again we see the irony of a free speech interpretation
that only protects expression which is irrelevant to the context in which it is delivered. See supra
text accompanying notes 164-67. It seems that, if anything, such circumstances actually increase
the justification for requiring the speech to be taken elsewhere, where it may be equally, if not
more, effective.
2 .See supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
-1 I use the word "silencing" rather than "censoring" to reduce any bias in my argument.
If the school's action can be seen as consistent with the proper educational mission of our public
schools, than the action cannot rightfully be labeled "censorship."
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democratic polity.
To fortify the argument that greater official recognition of the liberty
virtues is both possible and mandated in my "reformulated" Hazelivood
context, we need only consider the Court's response to the educational
conflicts that developed in the wake of its decision in Widmar v. Vin-
cent.23 5  In Widmar, the Court held that a public university, while
directed by the Establishment Clause to avoid promoting religion, was
required by the Free Speech Clause to provide religious groups equal
access to the university's "open forum. "236 Prompted by uncertainty
about the extent of Widmar's application to elementary and secondary
schools, Congress enacted the Equal Access Act of 1984.23  The Act
prohibits public secondary schools which have established a "limited public
forum" from denying a student religious group permission to meet on
school premises during non-instructional time. 238
Despite the statute, school officials at Westside High School, a public
secondary school in Omaha, Nebraska, refused to allow students to form
a Christian club, which would have joined the thirty other student groups
already approved as after-school extra-curricular activities.23 9 In Board
of Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,2 ° the
Supreme Court found that the school's action violated the Equal Access
Act, 241 and that the Act, to the extent that it provided public school
facilities to student groups intending to use them for religious purposes, did
not violate the Establishment Clause. 242 Much of the Court's opinion
focused on whether a "limited public forum" existed at the school243 and
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
6 d. at 269. The Court rejected the university's claim that granting access would imply
school sponsorship of the religious groups involved or of their practices. Id. at 274.
27 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988).
Id. § 4071(a). The Equal Access Act states that "[a] public secondary school has a limited
open forum whenever such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more
noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during non-instructional time."
Id. § 4071(b). The statute is not limited by its terms to protecting religious groups. Id. § 4071(a).
It also prohibits public schools which receive federal financial assistance from denying student
groups access on the basis of the "political, philosophical or other content of speech [likely to be
engaged in at the group's] meetings." Id.
" See Board of Educ. v. Mergens. 496 U.S. 226, 231-33 (1990) (plurality opinion).
240 Id. at 226.
_41 Id. at 247.
2 Id. at 253. Specifically, Justice O'Connor stated that "[a]lthough the Act permits 'the
assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other school employee to the meeting for custodial
purposes.' such custodial oversight of the student-initiated religious group, merely to ensure order
and good behavior, does not impermissibly entangle government in the day-to-day surveillance
or administration of religious activities." Id.
243 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 234-47.
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on the substance of Establishment Clause doctrine.244 The Court also
analyzed what constituted "school-sponsored expressive activities" within
extra-curricular activities.245 We will concentrate on this latter aspect of
the opinion since the term, as used in Mergens, appears to have a
significantly narrower meaning than it had in Hazelwood.
Westside's school board had adopted a policy covering student groups
and organizations that heralded them as a "vital part of the total education
program as a means of developing good citizenship, wholesome attitudes,
good human relations, knowledge and skills."24 Notwithstanding the
obvious effort of the board (totally consistent with the philosophy of
Hazelwood) to integrate all extracurricular activities into the common
educational missions of information presentation, skills development and
value inculcation, the Mergens Court not only refused to defer to the
board's curricular judgment, but adamantly rejected it.24 Yet the board's
policy hardly was indefensible, its pedagogical approach hardly unheard
of.24  Despite its reasonableness, the Court recognized that the
Congressional attempt, through the Equal Access Act, to demonstrate our
nation's support for, and desire to promote, experiences of expressive
liberty in our schools would be totally defeated if the board's holistic
understanding of education were approved.249 The board's approach
would mandate an emphasis on order and authority in all extra-curricular
meetings and functions equivalent to that which is justified in the
classroom, thereby smothering efforts to stress independence and tolerance
in any school activity.
24 Id. at 247-53.
4 Id. at 249-52.
Id. at 231 (quoting Board Policy 5610).
247 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 243-45. The Court stated: "To the extent that petitioners contend
that 'curriculum related' means anything remotely related to abstract educational goals . . . we
reject that assignment." Id. at 244. The Court then adopted the language of the Court of
Appeals, indicating that
[a]llowing such a broad interpretation . . . would make the [Act] meaningless. A
school's administration could simply declare that it maintains a closed forum and
choose which student clubs it wanted to allow by tying the purposes of those student
clubs to some broadly defined educational goal. At the same time the administration
could arbitrarily deny access to school facilities to any unfavored student club on the
basis of the content of the speech of that group.
Id. at 244-45 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 867 F.2d 1076, 1078 (8th Cir. 1989), aff'd,
496 U.S. 226 (1990)).
m See supra text accompanying notes 158-70 (recognizing logic of choosing to fully integrate
varying school components into common and consistent enterprise of value inculcation).
49 Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 244-45 (1990).
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Thus, as in Pico,2° the Court marked an educationally important,
if not a logical, division among extra-curricular activities, relegating some
to the domain of authority and others to that of liberty. Using a clearly
different understanding of "curriculum" than had the board, the Justices in
Mergens found that some officially-recognized, after-school activities were
curriculum-related and that others were not."5 For those clubs or groups
not adequately tied to the curriculum, the student expressive activities
associated therewith were understood properly as "permit[ted]" by the
school rather than "endorse[d]" or "support[ed]." s2  Tolerating speech
activities was different from sponsoring them. 3  Even the requirement
that each student organization, in order to be officially recognized, have a
faculty sponsor present at its meetings was insufficient to turn student
expression into institutional expression. 4  If school officials feared
others might erroneously conclude that the communication of students in
officially permitted expressive activities equaled school-sponsorship, they
needed only to publicly disavow the connection 5  For some extra-cur-
ricular activities, the virtues of liberty-tolerance, participation and
independent thought-were to come to the fore, thus adding another
dimension to the school's effort to educate for citizenship.5 6
2_0 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
25 Mergens. 496 U.S. at 239-41. The Court defined -curriculum related" to include any
student group of which
the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly
offered course; if the subject matter of the group concerns the body of courses as a
whole; if participation in the group is required for a particular course: or if
participation in the group results in academic credit.
Id. at 239-40.
22 Id. at 250 (stating "proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to
censor").
253 Id. at 252 ("Although a school may not itself lead or direct a religious club. a school that
permits a student-initiated and student-led religious club to meet after school. . . does not convey
a message of state approval or endorsement of the particular religion.") (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 252-53.
11 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251.
1 Mergens, of course, involved the interpretation of a statute. Too broad a definition of
"curricular-sponsored expressive activities" would have defeated the Congressional purpose in
enacting the legislation. Congressional attempts to ensure both liberty and authority experiences
in our schools, however, deserve no greater judicial support than does the Constitution's
character-building goals to which I have referred so often. See supra text accompanying notes 88-
90. In fact, as explained earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 235-38. the Equal Access Act
was an effort to extend to secondary schools the constitutional principles announced in Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Consequently, I have no difficulty extending the Court's
analysis in Mergens to constitutional challenges, such as those involved in Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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My conclusion that a Hazelwood-type situation (as earlier reformulat-
ed 7 ) should be decided in a manner more consistent with that of
Mergens is augmented by my sympathy for the efforts of the Hazelwood
student journalists. These high school students were not acting in an
immature or unprofessional manner. If the political issue of the day during
Tinker's 1960s was the Vietnam War, then the defining political and
cultural issues of the 1980s and 1990s well might involve divisions and
concerns relating to abortion, teen pregnancy, sexual harassment and abuse,
and parental responsibility. The articles deleted from the student paper in
Hazelwood were sincere attempts to consider the impact of these issues
upon the students of the school, from those students' perspective. When
responsible efforts to confront the real-life problems of today's adolescents
are silenced as too sensitive for publication, those affected are likely to
equate their experience with official disregard of free-speech values, rather
than with an attempt to secure needed school decorum in the face of
childish student behavior. Such lessons "teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes."" Students rightfully
would perceive such silencing as an act of "censorship." 9
Precisely because of the reasons which cause me to sympathize with
the Hazelwood student journalists, I find the Bethel decision26 more
compelling. The use of the sexual metaphor in the student's nominating
speech was juvenile and may well have conflicted with the school's mission
of teaching the limits of socially appropriate discourse. Inculcation of civic
virtue may necessitate public disapproval of vulgarity during a school
assembly.
To take such a posture, however, requires reconsideration of the
position I have long held: that the First Amendment should not "indulge
.. the facile assumption" that one can somehow separate the substance
and form of speech."6 "Speakers often choose words," I have written,
"not only for their cognitive content but for their emotive force.
2- See supra text accompanying notes 231-34.
23 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
,9 I believe the use of the label has now been proven appropriate. See supra note 234.
0 See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
61 See, e.g., Ingber, Socialization, supra note 31. at 65-66; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth. 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 32-36. The quoted phrase comes from Justice
Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). in which the Court held that
the First Amendment protects a person's right to wear a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the
Draft" in a courthouse corridor. More fully, Harlan warned: "[W]e cannot indulge in the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views." Id.
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Unconventional terminology used to convey unpopular ideas may be
essential to communicate the intensity with which the speaker holds his
perspective. ,2
62
When writing these words, I was still of the opinion that liberal
political philosophy properly provided the foundation of our constitutional
commitment to free speech. My conception of free-speech rights,
therefore, focused on their importance in furthering the goal of individual-
ism to promote autonomy and, relatedly, their interpersonal function of
promoting a "marketplace of ideas."263  More recently, I have come to
view as of equal, if not superior importance, the communal value of free
speech in fostering civic virtue and the democratic polity based upon it. 264
This more subtle conception of rights-including individual, systematic and
communal components-was presented earlier.2' Also suggested was the
proposition that, when dealing with children, the significance of free speech
relates more to the communal interest of character development than to the
individual's concern for the protection of autonomy, an autonomy that
children do not yet fully possess. 26  When dealing with adults, therefore,
for whom the securing of autonomy is of great import, free speech
demands that much significance be given to the individual's choice of
wording, with all of its nuances and shadings. For children, however,
especially in their role of student, where the inculcation of civic virtue is
the strongest justification for recognizing free-speech claims, promoting a
capacity to overcome private passion or appetite in public decision-making
is likely more consistent with First Amendment goals. Consequently, one
can approve of the monitoring of vulgar language in a school assembly, as
in Bethel,267 to promote a preferred level of social discourse without
simultaneously conferring upon the state the power to control the language
I Ingber, Socialization, supra note 31, at 65. Justice Brennan stressed this point in FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978) (holding that FCC may regulate radio broadcasts
that use indecent but not necessarily obscene language). In his dissent, Justice Brennan insisted:
The idea that the content of a message and its political impact on any who might
receive it can be divorced from the words that are the vehicle for its expression is
transparently fallacious. A given word may have a unique capacity to capsule an idea.
evoke an emotion or conjure up an image.
Id. at 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
, See Ingber, Socialization, supra note 31, at 15, 47-48.
See generally Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries, supra note 171 (discussing
importance of free speech as it relates to community interaction in general).
2 See supra text accompanying notes 73-90.
See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
, Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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of public debate generally.268
4. An Overall Perspective
Apparently, not a single aspect of the education process can separate
itself from education's inculcative mission. The inculcation of virtue, a
process upon which our founding generation depended for the success of
our nation,269 requires an appreciation for the value of both liberty and
authority. That appreciation realistically can be obtained only if stu-
dents-the youth of our nation-simultaneously become habituated to the
roles of order and authority and of tolerance and independence through
experiences that give credence to the proclaimed virtues of each. One
difficulty faced by schools which makes them such complex and fragile
institutions is that experiences of some of these virtues can overshadow the
experiences of others.'zT Yet, experiences of all are necessary for the
molding of the virtuous, democratic personality.
Dividing the educational process into separate components, each
accentuating a different set of virtues, is of some help. It is a blunt
I This distinction may be of greatest significance when school boards attempt to use
vulgarity as a reason to remove a book from a public school's library. A student told that she
must delete vulgarity from her school assembly address is still able to repackage her message to
convey some, if not all, of her meaning. Any loss in substance due to the change in form may
be outweighed by the training in preferred styles of social discourse. When a book is removed
for vulgarity, however, there is no opportunity for rephrasing, and the author's message is fully
removed from the school. This difference, when added to the symbolic communication of school
library book removals as described earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 191-94, cautions
against the "facile assumption" that substance and form can be separated in the library context.
Sherry, supra note 54, at 68-70.
270 Here lies the hopefully implicit limitation of Professor Hafen's assertion that "regulation
can protect adolescents even as it restricts them as a way to help them learn by their own
experience as their normal developmental processes unfold." Hafen, The Learning Years, supra
note 109, at 1061. Certainly, students need order and authority if they are to obtain the
information and information-gathering skills needed to be informed as adults. In addition, students
sometimes must be protected even from themselves because they do not yet possess personalities
with sufficient maturity to avoid risks of their own making. Id. at 1048-49 ("[L]imitations on
choice rights represent a form of protection for minors because they protect minors against their
own immaturity and against their vulnerability to exploitation by others."). But if we protect them
to the point that they do not experience the need to tolerate diversity, the thrill of independent
thought, and the empowerment gained by questioning authority, then we shall have protected
them to the point where they have learned the character traits of conformity and subservience.
Although public schooling requires us to admit that cultures do and should constrain, we
must not equate cultural influence with cultural domination. The socialization process within the
schools must appear to inculcate a tradition that we acknowledge to be unfinished or incomplete.
ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 207 (1981). Society must perceive inculcation as
neither too successful, nor too efficient. The system must remain ostensibly pervious-leaving a
space for liberty to reign.
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instrument, however, needing further refinement to avoid institutional
communications that "outrageously" denigrate any of these values. There
is little chance that school officials or education professionals will act to
discredit the school's commitment to order and authority, for these values
provide those individuals with their institutional status. But to ensure that
their actions do not impinge upon the believability of their liberty-
supportive and tolerance-supportive rhetoric, a credible threat of judicial
oversight must exist.27 Even if exercised solely for egregious cases,
judicial intervention in defense of free speech norms can both motivate
greater sensitivity of those norms by educators and provide public proof of
the sincerity of the community's belief in liberty's importance to otherwise
potentially skeptical students. Such a demonstration may help accomplish
the difficult task of indoctrinating children with the belief that individuals
who resist becoming wholly indoctrinated are highly valuable to society.
And so the educational enigma continues.
V. ADDENDUM
The desk at which I sat while writing this Article is only a few miles
away from the various sites associated with the Tinker conflict. In fact, in
Des Moines, the case virtually has become part of the community's
folklore. 72 This glorification of Tinker happened despite my belief that
the sweeping language used by the Court to ensure that our schools
inculcate the virtues of liberty frightened educators and led to a judicial
backlash. As a result of this backlash, the virtues of order and authority
have been reestablished as supreme in virtually all aspects of the official
" Thus, although the Supreme Court appears to have embraced the position of Hazelwood.
484 U.S. at 272-73, I cannot accept what Professor Hafen characterizes as his -modest and
general observation" that courts, subject to the principle of separation of church and state, should
defer expansively to judgments of educational institution authorities. Hafen, Schools. supra note
16, at 607. An assurance of deference may undermine Professor Hafen's own encouragement that
schools, on occasion, "elect non-directive methods that distinctly lack authority or that place a
premium on student initiative or student criticism of authority." Id. at 615.
2 A few years ago, for example, many of the principals of Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). came back to Des Moines to participate in a
"Visiting Scholars" program at Roosevelt High School, one of the schools where students wore
armbands. The first evening, a public discussion about the events leading to the decision and its
effect over the years, was held in the school's auditorium. See School Report, DES MOINES REG..
Apr. 27, 1992, at 9A. The following day, the Tinker students (and their former attorney) spent
time at the school talking with their present-day counterparts. Mary Challender, Three Who Took
a Stand See Results of Effort, DES MOINES REG., May 9, 1992, at 3M. A day after their
departure, the Des Moines Register had an editorial praising their courage and their role as
defenders of free speech. Dennis Ryerson, Reflecting on the Tinker Case, DES MOINES REG.,
May 10, 1992, at 3E.
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educational process. 3  It appears that Tinker has been left to reign in
contexts such as the cafeteria and school yard as well as other areas where
the speech involves private interpersonal communications among students
which neither are incorporated into, nor impact upon, the educational
mission. The residual significance of Tinker, therefore, has little to do
with the need to recognize a place for inculcating tolerance, participation,
and independent, critical thought-the virtues of liberty-in the planning of
our school structure.
Still, Tinker provides students with some expressive rights that did not
exist as clearly prior to the decision. The domain of private speech and
that of noninterruptive demonstrations of views not directly challenging
school policy would seem to remain-for whatever that is worth-within
the decision's continuing sphere of protection. But even here, twenty-five
years after Tinker, school officials still may not have heard or understood
Tinker's message regarding the importance of preparing students for, and
habituating them to, both the glory and responsibility of liberty.
Thirty miles up Interstate 35 from the scenes of Tinker is the city of
Ames, Iowa, an academic community housing Iowa State University. Just
last year an issue arose at Ames Middle School where four eighth-graders
were suspended for a day for wearing T-shirts designed to protest what
they perceived as sexism within their community.274
The newspaper account of the story goes something like this: For over
a year and without any institutional objection, a number of Ames Middle
School boys had been wearing T-shirts to school bearing the logo of a
restaurant chain known as Hooters. 5  The shirts portray owl eyes
peering out from Os in the word "Hooters". The shirts carry slogans such
as "More than a mouthful."276 The sexual innuendo is obvious.
Some girls at the school did not think the trumpeting of a message
about women's breast sizes from boys' garments was the most collegial
I There is one exception, however. Although presented initially only as a plurality view,
the restrictions on library book removals set forth in Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982), presumably remain in force.
I Douglas Bums, Four Students Suspended Over T-Shirt Controversy, DAILY TRIB., Apr.
20, 1994, at Al; Thomas R. O'Donnell, Kids Air Thoughts on T-Shirt Flap, DES MOINES REG.,
Apr. 27, 1994, at IM.
*-' In May of 1994, the national restaurant chain settled a sexual harassment lawsuit filed by
six of its waitresses. All Hooters waitresses are required to wear Hooters T-Shirts-often cropped
or knotted-and short shorts. The dress code had been an issue in the lawsuit, but terms of the
settlement were not disclosed. Sexual Harassment Suits at Hooters Are Settled, STAR TRIB., May
11, 1994, at lB.
276 Bums, supra note 274, at A2; Teen Girls Crow Back at Sexism. PLAIN DEALER. June 21.
1994, at 1E [hereinafter Teen Girls Crow].
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move in coeducation. So as both a spoof and a protest, the girls designed
and produced their own T-shirts sporting a picture of a rooster and
accompanied by the word, "Cocks." 2' The back of the shirt carried the
slogan "Nothing to crow about."27 Before wearing their shirts to
school, however, the girls approached the principal for permission.27 9 He
denied it.2" Some students wore the shirts anyway, and when a few
refused to obey the principal's order that they remove them or turn them
inside out, the principal suspended them.28'
Given Ames' location, no one should have been surprised when the
local paper, The Daily Tribune, published an editorial criticizing the
school's actions that quoted at length from Tinker.' The editorial
reminded school officials that "'students are entitled to freedom of
expression of their views,"' that "'schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism,"' and that "'students may not be ... confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.' '2
Recognizing that the entire skirmish was not a public relations bonanza for
the school, administrators organized a forum to discuss the incident and the
related issues of free speech and sexual harassment .2 4 During the forum,
the students defending the prohibited action were poised and articulate.
The history teacher who moderated the forum voiced his pride in the
girls.21 The Assistant Superintendent of Schools lauded them as
"thoughtful young people" who had been "beautiful through this."'M
The principal even conceded that he may have been wrong.2 7
How did the school then show its support to these "thoughtful young
people" who, despite institutional discouragement, had practiced the virtues
" Burns, supra note 274. at Al.
278 Id.
279 The girls actually asked permission! At the very moment of their resolve, they still sought
approval of the institutional authority. Somehow I doubt that the boys even considered such
deference before wearing their shirts.
Teen Girls Crow, supra note 276, at 1E.
,.1 Id. One may be curious about why the principal saw the need to ban the wearing of the
girls' T-shirt for even a day, when the boys had been freely wearing T-shirts parodying women's
breasts for over a year without raising any official concern.
282 Editorial: Controversial T-Shirts, Message Are Harmless, DAILY TRIB.. Apr. 26, 1994.
at A10 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969))
[hereinafter Editorial: Controversial T-Shirts].
_83 Id.
I8 Thomas R. O'Donnell, Ames Officials Cluck at Students' T-Shirts, DES MOINES REG.,
Apr. 22, 1994, at IM.
Rekka Basu. Girls Give a Hoot About Free Speech, USA TODAY. June 9, 1994, at 1 1A.
Editorial: Controversial T-Shirts. supra note 282, at A10.
27 Teen Girls Crow, supra note 276, at 1E.
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of participation and independent, critical thought? How did it correct this
error and portray support for tolerance rather than intolerance? It banned
both T-shirts.2s Someone clearly had missed Tinker's message.29 Or
perhaps that message simply has been washed away in the history of the
last twenty-five years.
Id.
_ The students were not the ones missing the message. For example. one of the girls
involved said, "We wanted to make people talk and think about [the sexist implications of the
Hooters T-shirts]. . . . We wanted them (the Hooters shirts) to be socially unacceptable rather
than legally unacceptable." Basu. supra note 285. at 11A (quoting student).
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